Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1974

SOVIET SOCIETY IN FLUX

David E. Powell
W. A. Douglas Jackson
Murray Feshbach

Peking and World Communism

Joseph C. Kun

Book Reviews

T. H. Rigby
Sergius Yakobson
Immo Stabreit
Jyotirmoy Banerjee

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: Soviet citizens stroll in an arcade at GUM, Moscow's popular department store. Photo by Tom Blau/Camera Press via Pictorial.

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Soviet Society in Flux

EDITORS' NOTE: In recent years, the USSR, like many other advanced industrial states, has experienced increasing problems as an outgrowth of industrialization and the process of urbanization that has accompanied it. But the Soviet government's strong dedication to quick economic development and the country's specific political system have given these problems distinctive forms. The following three articles deal with some of the most important of the problems. Mr. Powell explores the character of the continuing heavy migration from the countryside and the mounting difficulties that it has been posing for the Soviet leadership. Mr. Jackson looks at the consequences of rapid urbanization and the complexities of city planning and management. And Mr. Feshbach describes the apparently expanding institutional controls over labor mobility by which the government is seeking to combat massive turnover, maldistribution, and underutilization of labor in the Soviet economy.

The Rural Exodus

By David E. Powell

As a leading Soviet demographer remarked in 1972, "the countryside is moving to the city." During the period 1959-70, some three million rural inhabitants left their villages each year to resettle in Soviet cities, towns, and urban-type settlements. Half of them, finding urban life not to their liking, returned home. But the other half—a total of 16.4 million people—took up permanent residence in the cities.[1] Moreover, this exodus has been growing. While the annual net migration of rural dwellers to the city averaged 1.5 million in the years 1959-70, more recently it has been running at 1.9 million a year.[2]

This massive movement has resulted, in part, from official policy. Committed to a program of industrial development requiring the skills of a large, urban labor force, and perhaps sharing the contempt of Marx and Engels for "the idiocy of rural life," the Soviet government has over the years actively encouraged peasants and their children to move to the city. Until a decade or so ago, the authorities welcomed urbanization unquestioningly, viewing it as a prerequisite for industrialization and economic development and as a vehicle for increasing social mobility and for bringing "backward" citizens into the mainstream of socioeconomic life. Today, however, the authorities show an increasing ambivalence

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[1] V. Perevedentsev, *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 11, 1972, pp. 100, 104.

[2] *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 1, 1973, p. 36.

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Table 1: Percent of Secondary-School Seniors and Graduates Planning to Stay in the Countryside

(selected regions)

Place/date	Percent planning to remain
Smolensk Province/1964	20
Smolensk Province/1970	22
Sverdlovsk Province/1964	13
Crimea Province/1969	4
Kostroma Province/1969	15-20

SOURCE: Compiled from data in M. N. Rutkevich, Ed., *Zhiznennye plany molodiozhi* (Life Plans of Young People), Sverdlovsk, Urals State University Press, 1966, tr. in *Soviet Education* (White Plains, N.Y.), Vol. 11, Nos. 3-5, p. 106; *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 22, 1964, and July 12, 1970; *Pravda* (Moscow), April 15, 1969, and June 5, 1970.

toward the rural exodus. While still viewing the migration as "a historically legitimate, progressive process," "a response to the objective laws of social development," [3] officials and scholars are uneasy with the pattern of population migration and some of its unanticipated consequences.

Despite this increasing uneasiness in official circles over the character and consequences of migration, large-scale population movement continues. The present article will attempt to define what types of people have been leaving the countryside and why they have been leaving, what problems the leaders see in this exodus, and what is being done to alleviate the situation.

The Migrants

Turning first to the profile of the migrants, we discover that rural-urban migration within the USSR is primarily a movement of the young. In the main, it is the bright and energetic young people, those with drive and skills, who leave the farms and make their way to the city. According to Soviet statistics, the overwhelming majority of migrants are between the ages of 15 and 35, and most are teenagers or people in their twenties.[4]

As numerous Soviet surveys have shown, youngsters in the USSR are contemptuous of farming and anxious to avoid agricultural careers. The classic study, conducted a decade ago in Novosibirsk Province, revealed that only 12 percent of farmers' children planned to become farmers. Almost nine out of ten hoped instead to become industrial workers when they graduated from school. Children from non-farm families were even less willing to spend their lives on the land; fewer than 5 percent of them expressed any interest in working in agriculture.[5] Similar results surfaced in surveys of seniors and graduates of rural secondary schools in Smolensk, Kostroma, Sverdlovsk, and Crimea Provinces; generally speaking, only about 15 percent of the youngsters polled indicated that they wanted to become farmers (see Table 1).

This disdain for agricultural work usually leads to out-migration. A 1969 study of rural schools in the Crimea, for example, found that more than 70 percent of the graduating classes "expressed an urge to move to the city," [6] while a 1970 poll of secondary school graduates in Leningrad Province showed that only 5 percent of the youngsters stayed in the rural areas after graduation.[7]

The more mature a youngster is, the more apt he is to reject rural life in general and his village in particular. This was demonstrated vividly by a 1966 survey of children in grades eight through eleven in rural schools in Smolensk Province. While 72 percent of the children had decided to move to the city after finishing school, the proportion of pupils determined to leave increased from grade to grade. Some 65 percent of the eighth-grade pupils said they would resettle in the city, whereas the figure was 83 percent for tenth-graders and 96 percent for eleventh-graders.[8]

As for the sex of the migrants, men have been far more apt than women to leave the countryside. The most comprehensive study of migrants to appear—carried out by T. I. Zaslavskaia and her colleagues in Novosibirsk Province—found that 71.5 percent of all migrants were male.[9]

Among the youngest migrants, however, girls predominate. A survey of population migration in the Russian Republic for the years 1959-66 indicated

[3] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), July 23, 1966; *Sovetskaia kultura* (Moscow), Nov. 14, 1968, p. 2.

[4] Perevedenstev, *loc. cit.*, p. 103; D. I. Valentei *et al.*, Eds., *Problemy migratsii naseleniia i trudovykh resursov* (Problems of Population Migration and Labor Resources), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, pp. 57-58.

[5] A. G. Aganbegian *et al.*, Eds., *Kolichestvennye metody v sotsiologii* (Quantitative Methods in Sociology), Moscow, Nauka, 1966, p. 191.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow) June 5, 1970.

[7] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 26, 1972.

[8] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 23, 1966.

[9] T. I. Zaslavskaia *et al.*, Eds., *Migratsiia selskovo naseleniia* (Migration of the Rural Population), Moscow, Mysl, 1970, p. 139.

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A happy stroll on a Moscow boulevard, one of the attractions which lure many a village conscript to seek his future in the city.

—Klaus Lehnartz/Camera Press via Pictorial.

that the rate of migration from the countryside to the city among girls aged 16 to 19 was higher than the rate for boys of the same age.[10] Village girls, of course, have limited prospects for upward mobility in the countryside: the more interesting, better-paying jobs, which usually require more specialized training, tend to be "reserved" for men. Women typically are relegated to the jobs of field hand, milkmaid, or some equally menial role.[11]

Feeling a need to escape from this syndrome, rural girls are more strongly inclined than boys to seek admission to institutions of higher learning, and to improve their chances they tend to leave the village even before age 16.[12] They are eager to establish urban residence by age 15 or 16 in order to be sure of obtaining an internal passport at age 16 (withheld from most rural citizens), and thus be assured of the opportunity to attend urban secondary and higher schools. In contrast, village boys tend to wait in the village until they are called up for army service. However, once in the military, they know they would find few girls their age back in their native villages and hence are unenthusiastic about returning there after their release. (Moreover, military service, by providing young men with technical skills and expanding their horizons in other ways, reinforces the inclination not to return.) Young women who do *not* leave the countryside at age 15 or 16 face poor marital prospects there and consequently have little choice but to go to the city or to the North if they want to find husbands.[13]

Migrants also tend to be better educated than those who remain in the villages. One study of central Russia revealed that 61 percent of all citizens leaving the rural areas had at least some secondary education (complete or incomplete).[14] The Zaslavskaia study, too, found a strong correlation between the level of education of young people in Novosibirsk

[10] Valentei *et al., op. cit.*, p. 59.
[11] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* July 23, 1966.
[12] Valentei *et al., op. cit.*, p. 59.

[13] Some, of course, remain in the village and marry men younger than themselves, a phenomenon far more widespread in rural than in urban areas. See *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 8, 1973, p. 269.
[14] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 5, 1973, tr. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio—hereafter *CDSP*), Vol. 25, No. 45, p. 12. By contrast, 87 percent of those moving to the countryside from the city have, at most, a seventh-grade education.

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Table 2: Factors Attracting Rural Adults to the Cities [a]

Factors	Percent of sample citing given factor
The entire quality of life is better	30.4
Services are better	19.0
More free time	19.9
Better labor conditions	20.1
More interesting work	10.8
Higher wages	6.9
Easier to continue education	9.2
Other reasons	23.6

[a] From a survey in Novosibirsk Province.

SOURCE: T. I. Zaslavskaia *et al.*, Eds., *Migratsiia selskovo naselenia* (Migration of the Rural Population), Moscow, Mysl, 1970, p. 156.

Table 3: Motives Impelling Rural Adults to Leave the Countryside [a]

Motives	Percent of sample citing given motive
Dissatisfaction with content and conditions of labor	33.9
Dissatisfaction with pay	10.6
Desire to continue education (own or children's)	22.4
Desire to live in city	13.1
Family circumstances	10.1
Other reasons	48.6

[a] From a survey in Novosibirsk Province.

SOURCE: T. I. Zaslavskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

Province and their inclination to leave the countryside. Conversely, almost 40 percent of the "stable population" (those who intended to stay in their villages) had completed no more than three years of schooling, as against 19 percent of those planning to resettle in the city. More than 17 percent of those youths who announced their intention to leave had completed at least ten years of schooling, whereas only some 7 percent of those who planned to remain in the village had achieved this level of education.[15]

As one might expect from the data on educational backgrounds, the flow of bright young men and women to the cities consists heavily of people with specialized training and skills. Machine operators (tractors drivers, truck drivers, combine operators, etc.) as well as members of the rural intelligentsia (*i.e.*, schoolteachers, doctors, agronomists, and economists) are especially anxious to leave.[16] Persons born and raised in the villages see specialized training as a pathway to the city. Others, who have come to the countryside on obligatory assignments after finishing their education in the city, generally leave as soon as their period of required service (usually three years) is up.

The problem of turnover and out-migration among machine operators is particularly acute. 'n Novosibirsk Province, for example, collective farms lose about one-fifth of their machine operators each year, and farms in other areas experience a similar drain of skilled workers. Indeed, more than 2.5 million agricultural machine operators left the countryside during the brief period 1966-68.[17]

Motivating Factors

As already suggested, rural-urban migration results from a complex set of motives and factors involving a positive assessment of urban life and a negative assessment of rural life. According to the Zaslavskaia study, approximately one in five rural adults wants to live in a city. They point to the "quality of life"—the urban environment, better working conditions, more interesting and remunerative jobs, more and better services, and better opportunities to continue their own education or that of their children (see Table 2).

These positive attitudes go hand in hand with a set of negative assessments of rural life. The most common complaint or motive for leaving the countryside, according to Zaslavskaia, is dissatisfaction with one's work. More than one-third of those who expected to move were dissatisfied with the character of their work or the conditions under which they worked; a number also were dissatisfied with their remuneration (see Table 3). Moving to the city, they believed, would improve their standard of living and provide them with more satisfying work.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

[16] *Ekonomicheskie nauki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1973, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 6.

[17] Perevedentsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 100, and *Novyi mir, loc. cit.* (See the article by Murray Feshbach in this issue on the difficulties the Soviet Union has experienced in expanding the number of agricultural machine operators despite a prodigious training effort.)

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Young people in the countryside are especially apt to find their work unrewarding. Zaslavskaia found that farm workers between the ages of 16 and 29 were far more eager to change jobs than those over 30 (34.9 percent of the younger workers wanted to do so, as against 12.6 percent of those who were 30 or over). Moreover, those young people who were dissatisfied with their jobs and who could not find suitable alternatives in their own villages were far more apt to leave for the city than those who, while dissatisfied, still could find acceptable work in the countryside. Those who wanted to leave saw "city work" as attractive because it is less strenuous, requires a shorter working day, provides more hygenic working conditions, and offers better prospects for upward mobility than does employment on the farm.[18]

The problem is not simply that young people find farm work uninteresting or boring. They realize that they are not "masters of the land"; thus, they have little reason to remain. As Zaslavskaia puts it,

. . . the young people feel that they are not so much the masters (khoziaevy) *as hired laborers in agricultural production; as a rule, they have no share in managing the collective farm, the section, or the brigade; they do not participate in the making of important decisions, and therefore they have no opportunity to utilize their potential and their knowledge of the production process.*[19]

The second most important motive for leaving the countryside, according to Zaslavskaia, is the poor educational prospects there for oneself or one's children. Almost one-fourth (22.4 percent) of the adults questioned in her study cited this as a factor influencing their desire to move.[20] For people of school age (not surveyed by Zaslavskaia), dissatisfac-

[18] *Op. cit.*, pp. 193, 195, 203.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 200-01.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 163. See also, *Pravda*, March 29, 1970. Rather than move to a city, some rural parents move to villages with an eight-year or secondary school for their children.



Worlds apart—relaxation at a popular Moscow nightspot and chores on a collective farm near Odessa.

—John Launois/Black Star and Charles Kiensch/Pictorial.

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tion with the educational opportunities provided by the village school is *the* major factor in deciding to move to the city. In one survey, 83 out of 85 tenth-graders questioned said they were leaving their villages for this reason.[21]

The reasons for such attitudes are easily found. Almost without exception, rural schools provide children in the countryside with a less adequate education than that available to urban youths. Schools tend to be small, in a state of disrepair, staffed with poorly trained and overworked teachers, and—especially in areas of low population density—almost inaccessible to pupils. Instances of children having to walk ten kilometers each way to and from school are still reported in the press, while arrangements for bus transportation or boarding schools are inadequate or nonexistent. In some provinces (*e.g.,* Briansk, Kursk, Tula) and in the Maritime Territory, dormitory space is available for less than 20 percent of those who request it. As a result, large numbers of pupils are compelled to rent private apartments nearby—or not so nearby.[22]

Many rural schools are too small to provide youngsters with adequate training, and efforts to build schools in more villages tend to dissipate educational resources rather than improve education. The Soviet countryside is dotted with one-room schoolhouses and one-teacher schools. Indeed, a classroom in which the teacher works with three age-groups seems to be the norm for the small rural elementary school.[23] The educational consequences of such an arrangement are predictable. To quote a Soviet school principal, "even if the total number of pupils in the classroom is quite small, forty-five minutes divided by three results in a pedagogical zero."[24] Combined classes for several grades (*kombinaty,* as they are known in the USSR) are also not uncommon in rural eight-year and ten-year schools. (Almost 20 percent of rural secondary schools have no more than 280 pupils).[25]

More telling than the poor location and small size of rural schools are the inferior credentials of those teaching in the villages. Fully one-third of those teaching in the fifth through tenth grades of rural schools lack higher education, having been trained only in secondary teacher-training schools.[26] Because of the acute shortage of adequately trained personnel, some schools simply do not offer certain courses. Moreover, rural schoolteachers usually have to instruct in subjects outside their field of specialization, still further diluting the quality of education available to rural children. Those assigned to one-teacher schools suffer the most—some having to give as many as sixteen lessons a day in different classrooms and on different subjects.[27]

The heavy burdens on rural teachers help explain the reluctance of new teachers to accept positions in the countryside or to remain there. Graduates of pedagogical institutes, especially those assigned to rural schools in Siberia and the Far East, react with dismay to the prospect of teaching in a village. Indeed, one Soviet study found that even before teaching assignments were made, "many of the young women who were graduating began to arrange weddings with eligible city bachelors, while the men suddenly began to suffer from heart disease and terrible headaches,"[28] both obvious attempts to avoid assignment to a school in the countryside.

Every year, approximately two-thirds of all graduates of pedagogical institutes are assigned to rural schools, and for graduates in the fields of Russian language and literature, mathematics, physics, history, and foreign languages, the figure is 90 percent.[29] So many young teachers were assigned to rural schools in the late 1960's (1,224,000 during the period 1966-70) that it was thought possible "to bring the army of rural teachers up to all but full strength" by the end of 1970.[30] But a large number of those assigned to the villages—roughly 10 percent for the country as a whole and up to 30 percent in some provinces—never reach their destinations.[31] Unprepared both by education and by temperament to work in the countryside, they remain in the city and find other work.

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[21] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* July 23, 1966.

[22] See. *e.g., Komsomolskaia pravda,* Jan. 15, 1973, and *Izvestia* (Moscow), June 17, 1972.

[23] *Pravda,* March 29, 1970, and *Uchitelskaia gazeta* (Moscow), Nov, 29, 1973.

[24] *Izvestia,* Jan. 26, 1972.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] In the year 1970-71, the actual figure was 33.1 percent, itself a considerable improvement over the 42.4 percent of five years earlier. See *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 3, 1972, tr. in *CDSP,* Vol. 24, No. 44, p. 16. See also *Uchitelskaia gazeta,* April 14, 1973.

[27] See *Izvestia,* Sept. 4, 1973; also *Pravda,* Aug. 4 and 5, and Dec. 30, 1973.

[28] *Ibid.,* July 16, 1972.

[29] *Istoriia SSSR, loc. cit.,* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), No. 14, 1970, tr. in *CDSP,* Vol 23, No. 3, p. 21.

[30] *Izvestia,* Aug. 9, 1972.

[31] There has been some improvement in these figures over the years. Thus, in the Russian Republic the proportion of teachers showing up for assigned jobs increased from 85 percent in 1959 to 91 percent in 1970. See *Istoriia SSSR, loc. cit.;* also *Izvestia,* Feb. 17 and April 23, 1972, and *Pravda,* Aug. 4, 1973.

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What is more, those who do reach the villages to which they have been assigned will, likely as not, simply replace a teacher who is leaving after having fulfilled his or her three-year obligation. Moreover, some of the new arrivals begin making plans to leave as soon as they arrive. They "immediately take pencil in hand and write tearful letters to the . . . Ministry of Education, pleading to be released." [32]

Young teachers who return to the city at the first opportunity consequently represent a major component of the rural youth exodus. Moreover, they stimulate many of their pupils, and others of school age as well, to leave the villages. By their reluctance to accept a teaching position in the countryside, by their ignorance of agricultural life and negative attitude toward it, and by their early departure from the village, they point the way to the city for thousands of rural youngsters. As one *Pravda* article put it,

How can . . . a teacher talk to the children about love of their village, or develop respect for the work of grain growers, if he himself does not like the area or the school, and is merely waiting for the set time to expire . . . to leave these young people and this area forever?[33]

Rural pupils who stay on to complete their secondary education in the countryside are at a severe disadvantage if they try to continue their education. Even the Deputy Minister of Education of the USSR has commented on the "scant knowledge" of rural secondary school seniors and "the narrowness of their horizons." [34] Rural schools, as already pointed out, often lack qualified teachers of languages and other special skills, and since students usually have to take a competitive examination in a foreign language or one of the sciences in order to be admitted to higher-level schools, rural school graduates find the path to higher education almost completely blocked. As a result, urban students are greatly overrepresented in the student bodies of even provincial universities. For example, children of collective farmers constitute only 15 percent of the student body at Grozny University, in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.[35]

(It is worth noting here that urban youths also occupy a disproportionately large number of places at institutions or in specific courses explicitly designated for the training of future rural specialists. Thus, in 1972 almost 40 percent of the first-year students at the Vsevolozhsky Agricultural Technical School were graduates of urban schools, and at the Leningrad Agricultural Institute the figure was 60 percent.[36] Moreover, most of the urban youths attending agricultural schools would not dream of working on the farms and seek to learn mechanical or electrical skills which will guarantee them city jobs. In the case of those rural youngsters who do gain admission to urban secondary, vocational, and higher schools, the experience of urban life has the effect of drawing them still further away from the village. Once in the city, they are sure to appreciate even more powerfully the differences between urban and rural living conditions. Even those who said they would return to the village after obtaining some sort of technical training are likely to remain in the city.[37])

The consequences of all this are far-reaching, with each element of the problem reinforcing the others. The lack of trained teachers and the low morale and high rate of turnover among those who do teach in the countryside tend to perpetuate the low quality of rural education. In turn, the fear that their children will receive inadequate training, in conjunction with other considerations, impels hundreds of thousands of rural parents to migrate to the cities each year. This makes the rural schools even less attractive to prospective teachers and further aggravates the problem.

Of Wage and Amenities

Besides dissatisfaction with work conditions and the lack of educational opportunities, other factors help to bring about rural out-migration. The lower level of wages received by farmers and the generally poor quality of village life—what one Soviet commentator described as the "centuries-old economic and cultural backwardness" of the countryside[38]—also move many to resettle in the city (see Table 3).

[32] *Izvestia*, April 23, 1973. The overwhelming majority of Soviet schoolteachers are women, and the problems of rural isolation and poor marital prospects fall particularly heavily on them. See *Izvestia*, Sept. 4, 1973, and *Uchitelskaia gazeta*, Aug. 28, 1973.

[33] *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1969.

[34] *Uchitelskaia gazeta*, Nov. 29, 1973.

[35] *Izvestia*, April 23, 1972. On the obstacles to would-be higher-school matriculants from the countryside, see also *Pravda*, Aug. 4 and 5, 1973.

[36] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Jan. 26, 1972.

[37] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 23, 1966.

[38] *Ibid.*

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Collective farmers take a break at the village pump on a farm in the Kuban.

—Charles Klensch/Pictorial.

In fact, Soviet farmers do have grounds to complain. Their wages still remain considerably lower than wages for nonagricultural occupations despite serious efforts in the post-Stalin era to provide farmers with more disposable income. In 1965, the average monthly wage for collective farmers amounted to only one-half of that paid to industrial workers (state farm workers were paid roughly three-quarters the amount paid to industrial workers).[39] By 1969-70, largely because of the introduction of guaranteed wages on the collective farms, the wages of collective farmers rose to some 75 percent of average wages for industry (for state farm workers wages amounted to approximately 85 percent of industrial wages). However, the difference between the real incomes of farm workers and industrial workers remained substantially greater than these figures indicate, since the former receive only about half as much as the latter in benefits from social funds.[40]

Also significant in the context of the migration problem is the existence of marked regional variations in the disparity between urban and rural wage levels. The largest gaps between agricultural and industrial wages occur in the northwestern RSFSR, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East—precisely those areas that have been experiencing the most dramatic exodus of rural dwellers. Figures for 1969-70 indicate that in the Urals and Siberia, collective farm wages were two-thirds of industrial wages, while in the northwestern part of the Russian Republic the two were even further apart.[41]

In addition to such wage differentials, rural inhabitants have few of the amenities that urban dwellers enjoy, and those amenities that are available tend to be of lower quality and harder to obtain. Even basic necessities such as public utilities remain in short supply. While virtually all rural settlements now have electricity, central water-service is available to only 23 percent of the rural population, while household gas-service is available to only 18 percent. By the end of 1975, when the current five-year plan ends, only 30 percent of the country's rural residents can expect to have central water-service.[42]

Housing in rural areas also tends to be of low quality. Some new dwellings continue to be built without indoor plumbing, while other new buildings are said to be "nothing but imitations of old mud huts."[43] Moreover, consumer services are in short supply. In Orenburg Province, for example, where almost half the population lives in rural areas, only one-fourth of everyday-service enterprises (barber shops, laundries, etc.) are located outside the main cities.[44] Throughout the countryside, people have to shop in stores which are often short of goods, and which sometimes lack even the most basic necessities.[45] Again, the network of rural pre-school institutions is less well-developed than in the cities. There are too few nurseries and kindergartens, and they suffer from a shortage of school supplies, toys, and other equipment.[46]

Likewise, medical facilities and services in the countryside are inferior. Like schoolteachers, physicians are so distressed by the poor housing and living conditions they encounter in the villages that

[39] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1966, tr. in *Problems of Economics* (White Plains, N.Y.), Vol. 9, No. 12, p. 18.

[40] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5, 1972, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 45, p. 17. Slightly different figures are given in *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva* (Moscow), No. 11, 1972, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 12, p. 9.

[41] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5, 1972, tr. in *loc. cit.*

[42] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 2, 1973, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 20, p. 23. There is also the possibility that this target will not be reached: e.g., 20 to 25 percent of rural households were supposed to have gas-service by the end of 1970, according to the Directives of the 23rd CPSU Congress. See *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1966, tr. in *loc. cit.*, p. 22.

[43] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 16, 1968, tr. in *Current Abstracts of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 16.

[44] *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1972.

[45] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Oct. 2 and 3, 1973.

[46] *Izvestia*, May 30, 1973.

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they either refuse assignments to rural areas or return to the city as soon as possible, sometimes even before their terms are up.[47] As a result, there is a serious shortage of public health personnel in the countryside. In the Georgian Republic, for example, where the ratio of doctors to population is higher than anywhere else in the USSR, there were no physicians at all in 25 rural hospitals and 127 rural out-patient clinics in 1972.[48]

Finally, rural dwellers do not have adequate facilities for spending their leisure time. There are few theaters, cinemas, sports centers, or other places where they can relax. Rural clubs are said to lack "the spark of life," and few provide anything more than "boredom and empty rooms." [49] The particularly serious impact of this state of affairs on young people was indicated in a letter sent by a group of youngsters in a village of Tambov Province to *Izvestia* in 1972:

Dear Editor! Advise us how to occupy ourselves. It is dull and uninteresting in our village. Especially in the summer. The river is far away. . . . There are no sports facilities. The club has only dances and films for adults. The projectionist, even when he is sober, does not consider us an audience. . . .[50]

A journalist sent to investigate this complaint described the club as a "dirty, dilapidated building in the center of the village." He found that the lack of facilities for spending leisure time creatively caused some of the local boys and girls to indulge in drinking or commit acts of hooliganism. The local store did not sell books, the bookmobile rarely visited the village, and few shops provided goods or services that could occupy the youngsters. The local secondary school, which should have organized activities for the pupils when school was not in session, provided "nothing except a chorus and drama group that functions only a few weeks out of the year." [51] Young people from this village—and from countless others like it throughout the USSR—become bored and restless, and they ultimately leave for the city. Of the 40 students in the two most recent graduating classes of the local village school, only two remained in the village.

[47] See *Pravda*, April 4, 1972, and *Izvestia*, July 26, 1972.
[48] *Zaria vostoka* (Tbilisi), Nov. 25, 1972, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 50, p. 8.
[49] *Pravda*, Sept. 18, 1972.
[50] *Izvestia*, Sept. 8, 1972.
[51] *Ibid.*

So far, we have examined the particular categories of people that have been leaving the Soviet countryside and a number of the factors motivating them. From the Soviet viewpoint, this migration continues to have some welcome aspects—expansion of the industrial labor force and a rise in the mobility and social mobilization of the rural populace. However, in recent years, the authorities have become increasingly concerned about certain unexpected results of the massive rural exodus and have begun to reassess their once unqualified endorsement of it.

Unforeseen Problems

Officials and scholars cite four major areas of concern. The first is the apparent irrationality of migration patterns. Rural dwellers tend to move to the city from precisely those areas—East and West Siberia and the Urals—which already suffer from shortages of rural manpower, while rural inhabitants in areas of surplus rural manpower—Central Asia, Moldavia, and the Caucasus—have been the most reluctant to leave for the cities. In 1970, for example, the greatest relative exodus occurred in West Siberia, where 35 out of every 1,000 rural dwellers left their villages, and the lowest rate of out-migration (5 per 1,000) was recorded in Central Asia.[52]

Second, uncontrolled rural out-migration has been found to be "in conflict with the needs of agricultural production." [53] The best and brightest abandon the land, leaving the tasks of farming to older, less skilled, and less productive workers. Soviet studies showing a decrease in the rural population generally have revealed an even sharper drop among those of working age. In Novosibirsk Province, for example, the total rural population fell by 14 percent during the period 1957-68, but the number of persons employed on the farms fell by almost 24 percent.[54] (Furthermore, those listed as "able-bodied workers" on some collective farms include a substantial number of women whose husbands work at nearby enterprises. These women remain on the farms simply in order to cultivate their private plots for family needs, and they contribute little to the collective's production effort.[55])

The consequences of this trend for agriculture are predictable. Farmers in areas with serious labor

[52] *Nash sovremennik*, *loc. cit.*, p. 104.
[53] *Izvestia*, July 12, 1970.
[54] Zaslavskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[55] *Pravda*, May 25, 1970.

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Table 4: Trends in Rural Population, 1959-70

(totals for 1970 as % of 1959 totals)

Republic	Working-age population	Young adults 20-24	25-29	30-34
RSFSR	79	51	45	79
Ukraine	84	52	71	91
Belorussia	81	79	46	47
Uzbekistan	112	82	78	114
Kazakhstan	106	67	89	126
Georgia	98	61	67	102
Azerbaidzhan	103	51	53	140
Lithuania	82	60	70	88
Moldavia	100	65	81	103
Latvia	86	67	89	103
Kirgizia	115	79	70	110
Tadzhikistan	108	75	74	107
Armenia	97	50	50	104
Turkmenia	114	92	80	110
Estonia	85	79	83	96

SOURCE: *Ekonomicheskie nauki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1973, tr. in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 6.

shortages have to work twice as many days a year as do their counterparts in areas with substantial labor surpluses.[56] What is more, the former usually have to care for far more land than the latter. The exhausting pace of work in labor-short areas, exacerbated by pressure to work on weekends and during vacation time, leads many to leave for the city.[57] And, because it is those with more training who leave, much of the complex machinery intended to make work easier and to increase labor productivity on the farms is used inefficiently or remains idle.[58]

Third, rural out-migration has led to certain demographic changes—in both the cities and the countryside—that the regime finds increasingly troublesome. Those who reach the city tend to marry later and to have smaller families than those who remain in the village. (Throughout the world, of course, urbanization has generally led to lower birth rates, and the Soviet experience has been unexceptional in this regard.) During the period 1913-67, when the share of urban population in the total USSR population rose from 18 percent to 55 percent, the birth rate declined from 30 to 15 per thousand in urban areas. But—a fact that is often overlooked—the rural birth rate declined sharply, too—from 49 to 20 per thousand.[59]

This latter decline reflects the dramatic drop in the proportion of people in the ages 20-34 in the total rural population of all the republics in the Soviet Union—from 24.7 percent in 1959 to only 16.9 percent in 1970. The two largest republics, the RSFSR and the Ukraine, have been hardest hit in this regard (see Table 4). As a result of this drain, there are fewer marriages and a decline in rural birth rates, in some places to levels even below urban birth rates. In 16 of the provinces of the RSFSR, accounting for half the rural population of that republic, the rural birth rate has even fallen below the rural death rate.[60] The result has been a sharp rise in the age-level of the rural population left behind. According to one study, in 1967 some 38 out of every 1,000 workers and employees on state farms and 84 out of every 1,000 production workers on collective farms were over 60 years of age, whereas in industry the comparable figure was only 14 out of 1,000.[61] There is nothing to indicate a significant change in these figures since that year.

Finally, the massive influx of citizens into Soviet cities has led to a wide array of urban problems ranging from crowded housing, crime, and delinquency to emotional disorders and marital instability. Although the overwhelming majority of migrants increase their earnings substantially after arriving in the city,[62] they are beset by (and help to create) problems that largely offset these gains. These matters, beyond the scope of the present article, have received sufficient attention elsewhere.[63]

Official Responses

The authorities are only just beginning to work out a series of measures designed to channel migration—to encourage it in some areas and to limit it in others. Their objective is not to put an end to the process but to see that it takes place "on a

[56] *Zhurnalist, loc. cit.*

[57] *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva, loc. cit.*

[58] *Pravda*, Sept. 27, 1973.

[59] See Helen Desfosses Cohn, "Population Policy in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1973, p. 47.

[60] *Ekonomicheskie nauki, op. cit.*

[61] Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, New York, Walker and Co., 1972, pp. 204-05.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

[63] See *e.g.*, the accompanying article by W. A. Douglas Jackson; Walter D. Connor's *Deviance in Soviet Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; Cohn, *loc. cit.*; and Zaslavskaia, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-76.

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planned basis" and is "more rational" than at present.[64] To date, these efforts have been limited and ineffective. The processes of industrialization, urbanization, and migration from the countryside seem to have developed their own dynamism.

Measures designed to keep the young and productive members of the rural populace on the farms include (1) administrative restrictions on their movement and (2) positive steps to improve various aspects of life in the countryside.

There are two specific administrative devices which have been employed to restrict migration from the countryside and resettlement in the cities: the withholding of internal passports and the requirement of special residence permits in the largest cities. Thus, in theory, a farm can prevent outmigration by refusing to issue to its 16-year-olds the internal passport required for legal movement within the USSR. Similarly, authorities in the largest Soviet cities—*e.g.*, Leningrad and Moscow—theoretically can prohibit the settlement there of new migrants from the countryside by withholding special residence permits.

However, neither of these barriers has had the desired effect of limiting rural-urban migration. As one Soviet commentator observed, such administrative measures not only ". . . do not ensure the regulation of migration in the necessary direction . . . [but also] have many undesirable psychological effects." [65] Thus an investigation of migration from neighboring collective farms in central Russia, some of which do issue passports and some of which do not, has shown that the exodus from the latter is *greater* than from the former.[66] As we have seen,

[64] See, *e.g.*, *Pravda*, Aug. 1, 1970.

[65] V. I. Staroverov, *Gorod ili derevnia?* (The City or the Village?), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972, p. 75.

[66] Yu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotsialnaia struktura selskovo naselenlia SSSR* (The Social Structure of the Rural Population of the USSR), Moscow, Mysl, 1971, p. 285.



Cattle, apartments, and television antennas at a modern collective farm near the main highway.

—Lebeck/Stern via Black Star.

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many youngsters who know that they will not be granted a passport when they reach the age of 16 leave before it is too late. The withholding of residence permits has also proven an unsatisfactory means of restricting resettlement. As V. Perevedentsev has pointed out, bans on residency often produce "pendulum migrants," *i.e.*, people who live in one place and work in another. Migrants without residence permits must be constantly on the move to avoid detection, and this requires "unnecessary expenditures of the migrants' time and money and [puts] a strain on their nerves." Moreover, labor-hungry enterprises in the cities almost always find an excuse to obtain the appropriate document, for the prevailing practice seems to be one of "endless individual exceptions, circumventing the general ban." [67]

On the positive side, one of the major official efforts has been aimed at raising rural living standards. As indicated earlier, there has been a substantial improvement in the relative earning power of Soviet farmers since 1965. The party has also sought (though without too much vigor, it should be noted) to improve the networks of roads, clubs, and service facilities in the countryside, and it has promised to do more in the future.[68] Some Soviet observers have felt that such improvements, while they might not halt the exodus from the countryside, would at least assure that those who remained behind would be young, productive people "who like to work on collectitve or state farms. . . ." [69] Others, such as V. Perevedentsev, term such optimism "naive." [70] In fact, despite improved economic conditions in the villages, rural youths continue to stream to the cities. As a Soviet journalist wrote in 1969, ". . . it is impossible to keep young people in the village through material interest alone." [71]

This has led some Soviet analysts to propose changing the organization of labor in the countryside in order to make agricultural work more attractive. This involves more than simply investing in agricultural machinery—although, to be sure, such investment eases the farmer's task.[72] Zaslavskaia has argued that, since rural youngsters feel that they are



Seven young machine operators (graduated the previous spring from the village secondary school) are assigned shiny new tractors and formed into an honorary "Komsomol youth" team for work on the collective farm in an autumn 1973 ceremony in the village of Smolki, Gorkii Province.

—N. Moshkov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

"hired laborers" rather than "masters of the land," giving them more responsibility might induce some to remain on the land. Thus, she has urged that experiments with the "links" (zveno), or small, special mechanized brigades, be expanded. Surveys have indicated that workers in these agricultural detachments are more interested in their work and derive greater satisfaction from it. As Zaslavskaia has put it, "the need to make independent decisions on production problems, a lofty feeling of collectivism and the attitude of an owner (*khoziaiskoe otnoshenie*) toward the land, the machines, and labor radically change the attitudes of young workers toward farming, making their labor interesting and appealing." [73] The creation of such new attitudes, it is argued, will lead to more careful farming, higher labor productivity, and increased wages, eventually eliminating dissatisfaction with earnings as a motive for leaving the countryside.[74]

[67] *Loc. cit.*, p. 108.

[68] Particular attention has been paid to attracting people to rural areas in Siberia—through a combination of wage supplements, tax reductions, and other financial inducements. See *Novyi mir*, *loc. cit.*, p. 270, and *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitelstva SSSR* (Moscow), No. 13, 1973, p. 266.

[69] See *Izvestia*, July 14, 1970.

[70] *Loc. cit.*

[71] *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1969.

[72] However, this approach is not likely to be too appealing to Soviet planners, for in light of the severe shortage of skilled rural labor, "there is a real danger that further investment in agriculture, although desperately needed, will bring ever smaller marginal returns." Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[73] *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

[74] V. Perevedentsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 100.

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Perhaps the most crucial area in which official action is needed to combat the problem of rural youth migration is that of improving the educational opportunities available to the some 22 million school-age children in the countryside. So far, the regime's commitment to improving rural education has tended to be more rhetorical than concrete. Thus, it remains to be seen how much follow-through there will be on the extensive party-government decree of July 1973 on upgrading the plant, the staffs, and the curriculum of rural secondary schools.[75]

To be sure, a number of partial steps had already been taken before that decree. Some farms had begun to subsidize the education of young people who wanted to improve their skills through enrollment in correspondence or night schools.[76] Other farms provided stipends for youngsters to go to the city for specialized training—with the understanding that they would apply their new skills to farm work when they returned. In fact, some 20 percent of all first-year students at higher agricultural schools in 1971 were sent by their farms, a significant increase in only a few years.[77]

But there are still few places in the countryside where rural youths can acquire technical skills, and despite frequent demands for expanding the network of agricultural technical schools, very little has been done. Construction of new facilities continues to lag; in fact, a substantial portion of the funds allocated to build these schools has not been spent.[78] As a consequence, it remains necessary for rural youths to go to the cities for vocational training.

There has also been some effort to stimulate a greater enthusiasm for farm work among rural boys and girls in addition to providing them with training in agricultural skills. Soviet theory, of course, emphasizes that labor instruction and practical studies have a significant bearing on a youngster's ultimate choice of occupation. Thus it is argued that children who are not permitted, much less encouraged, to operate farm machinery are apt to lose interest in agricultural work.[79] To this end, efforts were made during 1969-70 in various provinces to have "the local schools begin inculcating into children when they are very small a love for the vocations of the countryside."[80]

More often than not, however, the teachers themselves continue to be inadequately trained and unenthusiastic about rural occupations and rural life. When the exhortations of teachers and education officials fail to strike a responsive chord in the rural children, it is sometimes deemed necessary to resort to other "incentives." One press report described an instance in which a school director refused to give a boy his graduation certificate unless the youngster promised to become a tractor driver or enter an agricultural technical school.[81]

Even when youths are interested in agricultural careers, the rural schools have remained ill-equipped to train them. Repeated appeals for help in this quarter finally elicited a joint party-government order that the appropriate government agencies provide rural schools with the motor vehicles, tractors, and other farm machinery needed for training purposes and that conditions be created making it possible for every youngster in a rural secondary school to study farm machinery or automotive engineering.[82]

Whether the measures taken thus far will prove adequate to moderate or redirect the tide of outmigration of the youthful portions of the rural population is uncertain. Some of the steps undertaken—*e.g.*, improvement of educational facilities and increasing access to mass communications—may even further stimulate the exodus. What is clear is that Soviet young people, like their counterparts in most countries, are strongly attracted to the cities and will bend every effort to get there.

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[75] "On Measures for the Further Improvement of Conditions for the Work of Rural General-Education Schools," *Pravda*, July 6, 1973, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 27, pp. 10-12.

[76] See, *e.g.*, *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1969.

[77] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Jan. 26, 1972. Specific data from three schools were indicative of this trend: "Of the graduates questioned at the Vsevolozhsky Agricultural Technical School, only 3 percent of the students had been sent there by the farms; at the "Besedy" State Farm Technical School this was true of only 2 percent; and the figure was 3.5 percent at the Leningrad Agricultural Institute. But among freshmen at these same higher schools, the figures rose to 42 percent, 26 percent, and 20 percent, respectively."

[78] See *Selskaia zhizn* (Moscow), Feb. 13, 1973.

[79] See *Pravda*, June 5, 1970.

[80] *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1970; also, April 15 and Aug. 14, 1969.

[81] See *Izvestia*, July 22, 1970.

[82] "On Measures for the Further Improvements . . .," *loc. cit.*

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Urban Expansion

By W. A. Douglas Jackson

The past 40 years, spanning the era of much of Russia's industrialization, have witnessed major transformations in the Soviet landscape. The reorganization of the farms, the modernization of the communications system and most forms of transportation, the energy revolution have all had their impact. The vast movements of people accompanying these developments—from the countryside into cities and into the Asiatic and further reaches of the realm—have enlarged the economic ecumene and produced a land of cities. By 1973, 146.1 million people, amounting to roughly 59 percent of the total Soviet population, were living in urban places.[1] Whatever the mix of causative factors, it is clear that the Soviet Union has joined the ranks of the urbanized nations.

Having devoted principal attention over four decades to increasing industrial output, the Soviet regime has only in recent years begun to take a wholistic view of what it has wrought.[2] While the regime has not been totally indifferent to city planning, housing, worker transportation, and other related problems, there has been little effort by the central planners to coordinate and integrate development in these areas. Now, however, the authorities have begun to think about the "urban way of life" and to recognize that it represents something more than the mere concentration of workers in an urban area. As one concerned Soviet scholar, V. V. Pokshishevsky, has expressed it:

"Way of life"—we use the expression and immediately become aware of its central role in the whole process of urbanization. Soviet economic geography regards urbanization as a phenomenon which is not to be treated as a mere rise in the percentage of urban residents in the country's total population. Far more significant is the heightened role of cities in the life of the nation, the introduction of the urban way of life (understood as a set of employment patterns, standards of everyday life, provisions of all types of services) in all—even the smallest—places and, finally, saturation of the rural countryside itself with these "city-type" facilities.[3]

This somewhat new and more comprehensive understanding of what urbanization should or might entail raises a number of basic questions with respect to the Soviet use of the term "urban." In the days of Imperial Russia, a "city" was a legally designated unit, a place declared by the government to be a city; the label had very little relation to the city's functions, inhabitants, or size. Even in the 19th century, certain locations, often highly-developed manufacturing centers, were counted as villages rather than cities because the owners did not want to pay the taxes associated with change of

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[1] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 godu, statisticheskii yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1972, Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 10.

[2] See, *e.g.*, O. V. Larmin, V. M. Moiseyenko, and B. S. Khorev, "Social-Demographic Aspects of Urbanization in the USSR," *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR*, Moscow, University of Moscow, 1971, tr. in *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation* (New York), February 1972, p. 99.

[3] V. V. Pokshishevsky, "Urbanization in the USSR," *Geoforum* (Elmsford, N.Y.), September 1972, p. 25. See also I. M. Mayergoyz, "Geographical Aspects of Urbanization," *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR*, in *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation, loc. cit.*, pp. 108-13.

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status and could bring influence to bear on the Tsarist regime.[4]

This phenomenon may in truth still exist (although the tax structure would have no bearing on the question). In the USSR today, there are two classes of places referred to as urban. They are, first, the *goroda*—the cities—and, second, the *posiolki gorodskovo tipa*—urban-type settlements. Cities are so classified on the basis of population, but definitions differ with republics; in the less urbanized union republics, the minimum size is as low as 5,000, whereas in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Moldavia it ranges from 10,000 to 12,000. Urban-type settlements are classified on the basis of occupation or function—*i.e.*, the distinguishing feature is that most of the inhabitants are employed in non-agricultural activities. At the time the 1970 census was taken, some 116.3 million people were living in 1,935 cities, and approximately 20 million more —or 14.5 percent of the population that was described as urban—were in urban-type settlements, of which there were 3,569.[5]

The classification of a settlement as urban on the basis of its worker-farmer ratio or its economic function tell us little about its "urban" features or way of life. Professor Pokshishevsky has suggested that life in urban-type settlements may be more animated (particularly in those connected with new industrial projects) and servicing standards may be superior to those in towns where economic progress is sluggish.[6] While this implies something about the inadequacies of smaller cities and towns, it does not add much to our knowledge of the settlements. But certainly a clue to the nature of life in both the cities and the settlements is the fact that almost half of the urban growth of recent years is accounted for by the influx of people from farms, villages and towns (amounting to 46 percent in the years 1960-70), and another significant portion by administrative annexation (14 percent in the same period.)[7] The city or urban settlement thus contains a large number of displaced persons whose outlook is more rural than urban, and its territory may embrace kolkhozes or sovkhozes and fields of grain or cotton, depending on its location.

However the urban locus is defined or qualified, there is no mistaking the fact that the concentration



A resident of Moscow tends a private garden behind his apartment complex on the outskirts of the capital.

—Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum.

[4] S. A. Kovalev, "Transformation of Rural Settlements in the Soviet Union," *Geoforum*, September 1972, pp. 34-38; Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 27; Roger Thiede, "Town and Function in Tsarist Russia: A Geographical Analysis of Trade and Industry in the Towns of New Russia, 1860-1910," Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, 1970, Chap. 2.

[5] See Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, pp. 25-27; Larmin *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 102-03. According to the census figures, the total urban population grew by some 34.2 million during the 1960's, and it should be noted that this total has expanded by close to another 10 million since (see footnote 1). Some useful studies of Soviet urban growth are: Robert A. Lewis and Richard H. Rowland, "Urbanization in Russia and the USSR: 1897-1966," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (Washington, DC), December 1969, pp. 776-96; Chauncy D. Harris, "Urbanization and Population Growth in the Soviet Union, 1959-1970," *Geographical Review* (New York), No. 1, 1971, pp. 102-24; Chauncy D. Harris, *Cities of the Soviet Union*, AAG Monograph Series, Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1970, Chap. 7; Kenneth A. Erickson, "A Map of Urban Places, USSR, 1970," *The Journal of Geography* (Coral Gables, Fla.), December 1971, pp. 555-60.

[6] Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 25. See also D. G. Khodzhaev and B. S. Khorev, "The Conception of a Unified System of Settlement and the Planned Regulation of City Growth in the USSR," *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR*, in *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, *loc. cit.*, p. 93.

[7] Data provided by Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 26, Table 3. (Note, however, that the Soviet figure ascribing 14 percent of urban growth to administrative annexation is contradicted by information in Lewis and Rowland, *loc. cit.*, footnote 10.) There is, incidentally, little suburban development in the USSR; the legal limits of a city either end at the built-up area or extend outward to encompass fields and sometimes villages.

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of people in urban areas has proceeded rapidly in the USSR. At the time of the first Soviet census in 1926, there were 31 cities with a population of 100,000 or more. The number jumped to 82 on the eve of World War II. Today there are at least 221, and of these, 10 have reached or passed the million mark in size. The highest ratios of urban to non-urban dwellers, approaching some 60 percent or more of the population, have been registered in the northwestern and central USSR, the Donbass, the Urals, and the Far East. Significant rates of urban increase have also prevailed in the European Southwest, in the Transcaucasus, and in Central Asia (notably Kazakhstan), according to a study of a recent 10-year period.[8]

The tendency toward concentration is underscored by the fact that some four-fifths of the USSR's urban population live in large agglomerations as opposed to one-fifth who live in what Soviet urbanist V. G. Davidovich has called "isolated" urban places.[9] As of 1969 such agglomerations, or "compression nuclei," had reached 450 in number, embracing all types of places from cities with a million population down to rural communities. In the RSFSR alone, 71 cities contained 45.2 percent of the urban population, and substantial numbers of workers lived in communities or on farms adjoining the cities.[10] Moreover, concentration/agglomeration is clearly an ongoing process. The 1966-70 plan called for more industrial development in medium-size and small cities in European Russia, but by far the greatest population increase has come in cities in the 500,000 to 2,000,000 category. These large centers offer not only greater job opportunities but also, in most cases, better living conditions, superior cultural facilities, and other amenities.

Controlling Urban Space

One of the most difficult tasks confronting the Soviet authorities is to establish effective administration of and control over urban space. On the successful resolution of this question hang the answers to many other problems—housing, water supply, land use, transportation, and so forth. For years the urban soviets have been handicapped by jurisdictional problems and by lack of funds, factors



The latest in high-rise living in the USSR—apartments along Moscow's impressive Kalinin Prospect, built to mark the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

—Klaus Lehnartz/Camera Press via Pictorial.

that have probably contributed in equal measure to what has—or has not—been done in the cities. While there are limits to the comparison, some parallels could be drawn between the baffling machinery of Soviet urban governance and the administration of large metropolitan areas in the United States—which constitute a patchwork of contiguous and overlapping jurisdictions, frustrating to managers, planners, and taxpayers alike.[11]

Today attempts are being made to establish more effective, comprehensive, and integrated control over Soviet urban space, notably under the provisions of an important "Decree on the Basic Rights and Duties of the City and Borough Soviets" enacted in March 1971. This decree represents an attempt to resolve some of the confusion and overlap that has plagued urban administration. Among other

[8] Harris, *Cities of the Soviet Union, supra*, pp. 288 ff.
[9] As quoted in Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.
[10] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), December 1969, pp. 36-45.

[11] See W. A. Douglas Jackson and Edward F. Bergman, *A Geography of Politics*, Dubuque, William C. Brown Co., 1973, Chap. 2; Robert J. Osborn and Thomas A. Reiner, "Soviet City Planning: Current Issues and Future Perspectives," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* (Washington, DC), No. 4, 1962, p. 240.

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provisions, it establishes—at least with respect to legislative intent—that:

The city soviet coordinates and supervises the activity of all the enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on the city's territory that deal with housing and communal construction, the construction of social, cultural, and everyday facilities, the production of consumer goods and local building materials, the elaboration and implementation of measures in the fields of public services and amenities, trade and public catering, public education, public health, culture, and other fields connected with services to the city's population. . . .[12]

There has not yet been time to see how effectively this decree can be implemented, but it would be foolhardy to expect that problems which have been decades in the making could be solved easily or quickly. While there have been some signs of the strengthening of the authority of local government—in certain urban centers dating back to a period well before the decree—it has been a long and difficult process that has encountered resistance. In particular, because industrial growth has had top priority for so long, industries responsible to national ministries have dominated the communities within which they were located, and they have commanded most of the local resources.

A few examples may serve to illustrate the urban dilemma.

A citizen of Izium, a town located in Kharkov Province (UkSSR) that has had to be totally rebuilt because of damages in World War II, has complained in *Izvestia* that although the town's general plan of development for 1970 to 1990 was approved by the central authorities, work could not proceed according to the plan since the city soviet had not been granted funds or supplies for the designing of new neighborhoods.[13]

A writer from Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine has protested that the executive committee of the city soviet does not always know the plans of the all-union and republic ministries and departments, and even when it does, it is not always able to influence them. The ministries have decided what, when, and how much to build in the city. Only when the question of allocating a plot of land has been involved has the soviet been informed about the general features of ministerial plans.[14]

In no other area of urban development has the impact of multifarious control revealed itself so strikingly as in the realm of housing. In Novokuznetsk in Western Siberia (RSFSR), according to one report, 155 different enterprises were responsible for most of the housing built for workers.[15] As of 1969, Dnepropetrovsk had enterprises under the jurisdiction of more than 40 all-union and republic ministries.[16] Even where a city has succeeded in unifying residential construction under its own control, it still has had to wage an unequal struggle with numerous enterprises to secure building materials. In any case, whether the responsibility for housing lies in the hands of industry or the city soviet, there are instances when neither body seems to have been judicious in its use of monies.[17]

In some cases, funds directed to the soviets for housing, schools, hospitals, or children's institutions have been used to construct administrative and costly entertainment enterprises and sports complexes. In Kazakhstan, for example, it was reported in 1970 that more than 30 club facilities and palaces of culture were under construction in cities of the republic.[18] Another report that year stated that Sverdlovsk, a city in the Urals region of the RSFSR with just over a million inhabitants in 1970, had eight sports facilities and eight clubs under construction, while neighboring Asbest, with a population of 79,000, had two new sports facilities. The latter report also criticized expenditures of 16 million rubles in Kiev (the Ukraine), 13 million in Tbilisi (Georgia), and 8 million in Baku (Azerbaidzhan) for cinema and concert halls when housing was needed.[19]

Poor judgment is also said to characterize the performance of industries with respect to the use of funds allocated for housing. Stadiums have been built while city workers were left begging for more humble facilities such as public baths and laundries. Funds earmarked for schools and other facilities where new industrial plants were being built have not infrequently been diverted to industrial purposes.[20]

[12] The decree is quoted in *Pravda* (Moscow), March 14, and *Izvestia* (Moscow) March 20, 1971.

[13] *Izvestia*, June 16, 1971.

[14] *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1969.

[15] Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 241. See also *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1970; May 29, 1971.

[16] *Izvestia*, Aug. 27, 1969.

[17] Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 241.

[18] *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1970.

[19] *Izvestia*, Sept. 2, 1970.

[20] Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 241.

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According to a 1971 estimate, about 10,000 rubles are required to meet the needs of each new urban resident and his family.[21] This amount covers housing; utilities; transportation; educational, medical, cultural, and sports facilities; and so forth. When a new city is built, funds for these purposes ordinarily are included in the total budget.[22] But when a plant is built or expanded in an old city, a reduction of the estimate is almost automatic. The assumption—quite logical in some respects—is that facilities already exist, and the city can provide for newcomers who will work in the plant.

The situation in Kazan (Tatar ASSR), population 885,000 in 1971, is illustrative of this dilemma.[23] Kazan has been growing principally through the expansion of existing enterprises. In the years 1966-70, the number of workers increased by more than 30,000, many of whom came from outside the city. This influx of population called for an expansion of municipal and other services. But the ministries and departments planning the expansion of industry did not allot funds for housing and other facilities. This has created a severe housing shortage, with overloads on existing municipal services. During the decade of the 1960's a compressor plant in Kazan was said to have halved its spending for social needs while almost doubling its capital investments, thus increasing the worker population by about 3,000. Another plant which should have provided 75,000 square meters of housing space for its 3,500 new workers instead made available only 12,000 square meters for housing and at the same time spent next to nothing to expand services. Typically, the city soviet has complained that directors of industrial plants think the construction and maintenance of municipal facilities are solely the concern of the local government—and the allocation of resources seems to indicate that this view has been shared by some members of the central planning committee of the USSR.

Part of the urban dilemma has lain in problems associated with reconstruction. Often large segments of cities have been pulled down without adequate provision for relocating the inhabitants. The redevelopment of Novosibirsk, for example, led to the eviction of some 200,000 occupants from their living quarters.[24] Many central residential areas, as any traveler to the USSR can testify, are still covered with prerevolutionary one and two-story houses, often in need of substantial repair. While there is understandable reluctance at the local level to destroy such usable low-grade housing because of the shortage of living space, its existence nevertheless runs contrary to the fulfillment of the overall housing plan.

A recent three-year period saw the destruction of 26 percent of the old structures in Voronezh (Ukraine), 25 percent of those in Kemerovo and Cheliabinsk (RSFSR), and 23 percent of those in the Tatar ASSR, according to reports that were clearly critical; similar complaints of demolition without adequate replacement of housing have come



Renovation of old buildings in Moscow.

—Robert Capa/Magnum.

[21] *Izvestia*, Jan. 6, 1971.

[22] Sometimes, however, funds are not scheduled as desired or needed. In the aforementioned case of Izium, for example, construction of the town's central school was not included in the 1971-75 plan, although the facility was needed (see *ibid.*, June 15, 1971).

The construction of cooperative housing may afford a way of achieving desired goals without necessarily having to budget the funds to cover the entire building cost. That this device has proved effective may be deduced from the sharp increase in the USSR in cooperative housing construction in recent years. Urban soviets have been required only to grant the cooperatives vacant parcels of land and to link them up with urban utilities. By the end of the 1966-70 plan period, this type of grant consumed 10-15 percent of the appropriations of local soviets for communal housing, a contribution that was to triple under the 1971-75 plan. (See *ibid.*, May 18, 1971.)

[23] *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1971.

[24] Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 245.

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from Odessa and Simferopol (Ukraine), Vladimir and Briansk (RSFSR), and other cities.[25]

Even in cities which have managed to achieve a significant expansion of housing, a lack of coordination between basic construction and finishing work often leaves apartment units standing empty for months. In Moscow it was reported in the spring of 1971 that construction work equivalent to 112 percent of the amount of housing commissioned (on the basis of centralized state investments) had been carried over from 1970 in the form of unfinished housing. Although the situation in Leningrad was better, the amount of construction resources tied up in unfinished housing still totaled 46 percent of the value of the housing commissioned.[26]

While the need for implementing a coordinated program of building and finishing housing has long been recognized, the continued lack of such integration has led to waste and deterioration. Perhaps as much of a problem as unfinished housing standing empty is the occupation of new quarters by house-hungry tenants before all construction defects have been eliminated. In either case, delays, low-quality workmanship, and poor-quality construction materials have aggravated the process of deterioration and the need for repairs.

In medium-size and small cities, a penchant for the construction of housing with an excessive number of floors has developed. It has been estimated that high-rise units of more than nine floors cost 10-14 percent more per square meter than apartment buildings of from five to nine stories; the cost of providing heat, water, electricity, sewers, and possibly lift service for high-rise apartments is also proportionately greater.[27] Similarly, the estimated cost per square meter of a nine-story building is 7 percent higher than that of a five-story structure. It thus seems clear that considerable extra expense, if not outright waste, has been incurred in the buildup of new and small cities. One Soviet writer has complained that in Novokuznetsk, for example, there is no justification for building even five-story buildings, since most structures must sit on expensive pilework foundations owing to the nature of the soil.[28]

[25] *Izvestia,* Sept. 14, 1969, and Sept. 2, 1970.

[26] *Pravda,* June 10, 1971; *Izvestia,* March 7, 1971. See also reference in *Sovetskaia Rossia* (Moscow), Jan. 3, 1969, concerning construction at Toliatti (RSFSR).

[27] *Pravda,* Sept. 24, 1969.

[28] *Izvestia,* March 7, 1971.

The lack of adequate housing is frequently cited as a cause of high labor turnover and worker migration within and between urban areas. In Kiev, prior to the construction in the late 1960's of hotel-type apartments designed to meet the needs of young married couples, one-fourth of all workers in the city annually left their jobs.[29] Obviously, the housing shortage that prevails in most Soviet cities makes for an unsettled life, the consequences of which in socioeconomic or even psychological terms may be considerable. The problem undoubtedly is more acute in some regions than in others. Shortages of housing, along with a lack of cultural amenities, have long been admitted to be critical deficiencies in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions of the USSR. From 1959 to 1965, Western and Eastern Siberia lost over 350,000 people in net out-migration (not all of them, of course, were from cities or urban-type settlements).[30]

Growth, Size, and Land Use

Until recently, the architect has played less than a leading role in the designing of Soviet cities. Even now, there are only a few major cities where institutes under the direction of a chief architect have been established to plan urban development under the jurisdiction of the executive committee of the city soviet. It will be interesting to watch the growth of such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, where new management systems have been introduced. In the rest of the cities, the planning and carrying out of urban development decisions have remained fragmented. Moreover, it seems fair to assume from the evidence available that Soviet urban planning has remained for the most part subordinate to the dictates of central economic planning and to the requirements of industrial production and political control. Despite the efforts of the central government to establish clearer lines of jurisdiction, the means available to city governments

[29] *Pravda,* March 21, 1970. The distinctive feature of the hotel-type apartment building is that each one-room apartment contains all conveniences, including a small living space, a separate kitchen with a gas stove and a sink for dishes, and a bathroom with toilet. This affords a family privacy that is still rare in Soviet housing. See also the discussion of housing in Kharkov, *Pravda,* Oct. 1, 1971.

[30] On the subject of labor mobility, see Lance Werner, "Inter-Regional Redistribution of Soviet Industrial Labor, 1959 to 1965: The Problems of Soviet Internal Migration," Master of Science Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1971, pp. 23 ff.

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

Architects at the Moscow Institute of Standard and Experimental Design discuss plans for apartment houses built from preformed structural parts.

—V. Runov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

to become masters in their own houses and to make decisions concerning the future have frequently been ineffective.

Even in the more advanced cities, the machinery of local planning may not always function smoothly or produce the right decisions. For example, the Leningrad General Plan, drawn up by the Leningrad Civil and Housing Construction Planning Institute, predicted in 1962 that by 1980 the city's population would be 3.2 million, but by January 1, 1971, it had already reached 4 million. A similar error was made in Kiev, where the population reached almost 1.7 million by 1971, although the projection for 1980 was 1.5 million.[31]

Associated with the problems of growth and planning is the question of land-use control. Allocation of the right to use a particular urban lot is, for the most part, vested under Soviet law in the municipal government. Although many Soviet writers frequently call for rational land use or cite examples where land is used irrationally, it is not at all clear what precisely constitutes rationality in this realm or by what test the rationality or irrationality of particular urban patterns may be determined.[32] It has been reported from Central Asia that irrigated land earmarked for growing cotton is used with increasing frequency for the construction of new housing developments.[33] On the other hand, Dushanbe (Tadzhik SSR) was criticized some years back for putting 400 hectares of land into cotton near the city center, while housing had to be built up to eight kilometers away.[34] In the case of an urban area in Kazakhstan, badly needed, productive suburban truck-farming land was said to have been turned over for industrial development, not only displacing the villagers nearby but also adversely affecting the local food supply.[35] Soviet agricultural resources are immense, but—the question of climatic conditions aside—bureaucratic management has contributed little to making the USSR a land of plenty, as recent large grain imports from North America and food shortages in European Russia have clearly demonstrated. Thus, any proposed loss of good agricultural land to industry in the expansion of urban settlement warrants close attention and perhaps more effective control. The new decree on the authority of the city soviet may help remedy this situation.

Urban planning is, of course, vitally related to the question of ultimate city size.[36] The problem for the large cities is that of controlling further growth rather than achieving an optimal size. Here the main pressure, as we have seen, comes from the industries themselves, which prefer to locate and to expand in large cities in order to avail themselves of labor and existing services. In general, city governments seem to have welcomed new industry, even though they may realize that new enterprises bring additional problems.

While very considerable progress has reportedly been made in diverting investment away from the large to the smaller cities, the latter have been moving forward at a tempo that remains unsatisfactory—at least from the viewpoint of the planners. In Lithuania, for example, the size of the employed population in small centers increased significantly during the 1960's—but the rate of increase was still higher in the three oldest and largest cities, Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda.[37] Over the five years 1966-70, the rise in the number of persons em-

[31] *Izvestia*, Aug. 27, 1969; Oct. 20, 1970; March 7 and Oct. 7, 1971.

[32] *Pravda*, May 4, 1971; Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 243.

[33] *Izvestia*, March 7, 1971.

[34] Osborn and Reiner, *loc. cit.*, p. 243. One hectare equals 2.47 acres, and one kilometer equals .62 miles.

[35] *The New York Times*, June 1, 1966. See also W. A. Douglas Jackson, "Wanted: An Effective Land Use Policy and Improved Reclamation," *Slavic Review* (Seattle), September 1970, p. 411.

[36] Khodzhaev and Khorev, *loc. cit.*, p. 97; Pokshishevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 31.

[37] *Izvestia*, May 8 and July 13, 1971.

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ployed in the three cities accounted for more than half the increase for the entire republic. Predictably, the socioeconomic problems of the larger cities have been aggravated, and municipal services have been strained or have deteriorated.

The authorities in Omsk Province in Western Siberia (RSFSR) have reported a similar problem. The province contains six cities and 12 workers' settlements, but as of 1969 more than 85 percent of all industrial output remained concentrated in the provincial center, Omsk city. Moreover, working at cross purposes with the regime's injunction giving preference to smaller urban centers, the general plan of development for the province contained provisions that portended further concentration at the center.[38]

With respect to those cities which have not yet been hugely inflated by the urban population "explosion," some attention has been given to the question of optimal size.[39] For the most part, the criterion of optimality seems to be related to efficiency in the construction and maintenance of housing and of municipal services. Urban planners, whatever their difficulties, seek to achieve that population size associated with least-cost levels of aggregate capital and operating outlays. Traditionally, they have given less emphasis to the notion of livability, but they have not totally ignored access to work and open spaces, the consequences in social terms of an excessively large and rapid urban agglomeration, questions pertaining to pollution and sewage disposal, and so on. Still, they operate under a basic handicap: the achievement of optimality must not be allowed to impair industrial activity. Some Soviet urban specialists have even begun to question the concept of optimality. V. G. Davidovich—to cite one—has suggested that the faster growth of large (as opposed to small) cities should be regarded as a reflection of greater labor efficiency and indeed has characterized this correlation as an objective law of the economy.[40]

Progress hits Naberezhyne Chelny, a town on the Kama River, whose population is expected to swell to 300,000 in the next few years with the development of the mammoth Kama Truck Factory. This picture shows apartments for automotive workers rising in what is identified as "Residential District No. 1 of the New City."

—E. Grabilin/Novosti via Sovfoto.

One crucial aspect that Soviet planners must take into account in calculating future urban needs is the overall demographic trend in the USSR. While the urban population has increased at a rapid rate, there has been a decline in the rate of growth of the total population, noticeable since the early 1960's. The potential effect of this trend on the future labor force has been a matter of some concern to the authorities.[41] While the reasons for the decline need not be discussed here, it is pertinent to note that there has been talk in the USSR of the possibility of a future policy to encourage the birth of two or three children per family. Should the Soviet regime ever decide on such a course, it will have to prepare itself for some obvious consequences, including vastly greater urban pressures.

Transportation and Pollution Problems

Without doubt, transportation is a major problem in most Soviet cities. The location of large residential districts at distances of 8-12 kilometers from the center of town and from other places of employment puts a heavy burden on the public transport system. In the large cities, a steady flow of from 15,000 to 25,000 passengers an hour to the center of the city has become a standard pattern, and even though the beginning of the working day is staggered over two

[38] *Planovoe khoziaistvo, loc. cit.*

[39] See, *e.g.*, V. G. Davidovich, "Quantitative Regularities in Urbanization of the USSR," *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR*, in *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 87-88; Khodzhaev and Khorev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

[40] Davidovich, *loc. cit.*, p. 87.

[41] *Vopsosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), February 1971, pp. 45-51; Larmin *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 106.

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or three hours, busses, trolley busses, and streetcars are unable to cope with the flow.[42] It is not uncommon for traffic to become congested on narrow central streets, for excessive amounts of pollutants to be emitted, and for a worker to spend from one to two hours or more getting to work.

From 1950 to 1967, the number of passengers carried by urban transportation systems increased from 7.7 billion to 35.8 billion.[43] The number of bus passengers alone jumped from 51.9 million in 1950 to more than a billion by 1970.[44] The situation seems destined to get worse unless provision is made for rapid and integrated transportation systems, but the problem is difficult to resolve because urban areas tend to lack single transport authorities.

Meantime, for good or ill, the automobile has increasingly become a part of Soviet life. From 1965 to 1970, the USSR produced about 250,000 cars a year of the size of the Volga or smaller. Of these, about a third were sold abroad, and the rest—between 170,000 and 180,000—remained for domestic use.[45] Output is scheduled to reach 1.2-1.5 million a year in the near future, and planners estimate that approximately 15 million cars will be on the road by 1980.[46]

Thus, some very fateful decisions must soon be made. While there has not yet been any official endorsement of private ownership, the increasing availability of autos together with the growing affluence of some citizens undoubtedly means that more and more cars will find their way into individual hands. The policies of the past, which were based on the assumption that automobile usage would be largely limited to taxi fleets and rentals, will no longer suffice to meet the problems created by the growing number of autos that have joined busses and trucks on Soviet

[42] *Pravda*, April 24, 1969.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Khodzhaev and Khorev, *loc. cit.*, p. 94. See *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1971, for a discussion of the need for unified transport systems in cities.

[45] *Izvestia*, Aug. 16, 1969, and July 24, 1971; *Pravda*, Sept. 3, 1969, and July 24, 1971.

[46] *Izvestia*, Jan. 23, 1972. See also *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), April 17, 1973.

Commuters scramble aboard a trolley in Leningrad.

—Renato Perez/Sovfoto.

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city streets—problems long known in Western countries.[47]

At present, road safety is low in the USSR, and accidents are common (relative to the number of cars) because of inefficient organization of traffic, poor road conditions, poor auto repair, and lack of skill or caution on the part of drivers. As in the realm of housing, there is a disproportion between the sphere of production and the sphere of services; thus, gas stations and repair facilities are scarce even in the big cities, where the taxi fleets are concentrated. This has led to reliance on makeshift garage services and to black-marketing in spare parts and gasoline. Should the decision be made to endorse the acquisition of personal cars, the cities will be faced with the need for a sharp increase in stations, repair facilities, motels, and related hostelries, and for improvement of road surfaces.

The coming of the personal car must also lead to increasing air pollution unless steps are taken to impose controls on exhaust. Signs of auto pollution in Soviet cities were discovered as early as 1956, and already alarming concentrations of carbon monoxide, equal to those in US cities, have been reported.[48] Though the number of autos is substantially smaller than in North America, the problem of air pollution is serious because of the quality of Soviet gasoline (which has a high sulphur content), the high emission of carbon monoxide, and the overextended life of Soviet autos, which become increasingly inefficient in their use of gasoline. Thus, pollutants in the air from the Soviet auto are out of proportion to the number of cars in operation.

Of course, the automobile is not the only source of air pollution. The concentration of industrial activity in cities, together with the presence of thermal electric plants, has given rise to levels of pollution exceeding acceptable Soviet norms.[49] The good intentions of the Soviet regime with respect to controlling the worst effects of pollution in cities are often frustrated by planners and industrialists alike.[50] Housing is sometimes placed near an offensive industrial plant, while the closing down and relocation

A taxi and a police motorcycle at one of Leningrad's few automobile service stations.

—Renato Perez/Sovfoto.

of a plant may simply transfer the nuisance to another region.

Pollution of rivers and streams has also had deleterious effects on urban water supplies which, like other services, may not be entirely under the control of the urban soviet.[51] In many cities, water supply systems are antiquated—as in the case of Omsk, which, despite its location on the Ob River, cannot adequately meet the demand engendered by its mushrooming housing. Such an example seems not to be unique.[52]

Prospects for the Future

As suggested earlier in this paper, Soviet urban specialists have set forth some interesting notions that reflect both idealistic and ideological influences in their discussion of the long-range future of Soviet society. To quote D. G. Khodzhaev and B. S. Khorev, coauthors of a 1972 study:

The essence of long-range changes in the settlement and growth of cities lies in the fact that the gradual erasing of differences between town and countryside yields a unified system of settlement whose planned

[47] See *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Sept. 16 and Nov. 11, 1970.

[48] See Victor Lee Mote, "The Geography of Air Pollution in the USSR," Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, 1971, pp. 94 ff.

[49] See I. P. Gerasimov, Ed., *Natural Resources of the Soviet Union: Their Use and Renewal*, tr. by Jacek I. Romanowski and ed. in English by W. A. Douglas Jackson, San Francisco, Freeman & Co., 1971, pp. 79-88.

[50] See Marshall I. Goldman, *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1972, pp. 122-50.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Pravda*, March 14, 1971. See also *Izvestia*, March 20, 1971.

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New apartments rise in the Avtozavodskii District of Toliatti. A road connects this district—scheduled to house 150,000 automobile workers by 1975—with the nearby Volzhskii Motor Works.

—A. Prazdnikov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

regulation may help prevent haphazard and uncontrolled city growth. In a bourgeois society, the town tends to dominate over the countryside. The elimination of the old division of labor in a classless society would mean . . . the merging of town and countryside. [The result would be] not the absorption of the countryside by the town, as some urbanologists contend, but precisely a merging of these two forms within the framework of a unified system of settlement. In the countryside man is, as a rule, subordinate to nature, and in the town he is unnaturally divorced from nature; in the future unified system of settlement, he would be harmoniously merged with nature.[53]

Marx believed that Communist society would usher in a new era of human history wherein the exploitation both of nature and of man would cease to be. Yet it is hard to see how a "unified system of settlement," conceived as a way to promote these new harmonious relationships, could actually be achieved in the light of present trends in Soviet urban life. Indeed, it is not even clear how the very pressing problems of the moment will be handled and resolved. The recent legislation aimed at coordination of the functions of local governance appears to be a move in the right direction, if it in fact leads to stricter controls over land use. Beyond that, new measures will surely be required to tackle the housing question, transportation, environmental pollution, municipal services, and the like. Certainly the Soviet system of providing foodstuffs to the cities poses a host of problems that, by Western standards, beg solution. And although little has been said in Soviet sources about the socioethnic aspects of city life,[54] a question that should not be ignored is the extent to which the rubbing together of different ethnic groups in crowded areas may contribute to a new type of problem—one familiar in many industrialized countries in the West.

At the same time, it would be unwise and unfair to prejudge the capacity of the Soviet regime to move on the complex array of urban difficulties facing it. The increasing concern shown both by the political authorities and by social scientists and scholars about the nature and quality of Soviet urban life in itself gives hope of progress, and the relevant recommendations and proposals that are beginning to proliferate warrant close study. As for the longer-range visions of a harmonious life for all, it is possible to appreciate and applaud the striving toward a system of spatial management that is both functional and capable of satisfying human needs,[55] even if that goal seems out of reach for the foreseeable future.

[53] Khodzhaev and Khorev, *loc. cit.*, p. 91.

[54] Two works that touch on the question are V. V. Pokshishevsky, "Urbanization and Ethnogeographic Processes," *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR*, in Soviet *Geogrpahy: Review and Translation*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 113-19; and V. I. Kozlov, "Ethnic Processes in the USSR," *Geoforum*, September 1972, pp. 47 ff. Pokshishevsky suggests that in the USSR it is now the city, perhaps more than the countryside, that has become the "carrier of the ethnos" (p. 116). Kozlov states that "by mixing these groups in everyday life, in places of work, schools, etc., cities become in a certain sense 'melting pots' for ethnic processes" (p. 51). It will be interesting for the Western scholar to watch these processes.

[55] See Alexei Gutnov *et al.*, *The Ideal Communist City*, New York, George Braziller, 1970.

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Manpower Management

By Murray Feshbach

In contrast to the past, when Soviet planners could count on a virtually unlimited supply of manpower—at least unskilled manpower—to fuel the economic growth of the USSR, they now face a situation in this regard which holds many disquieting elements for the future. Already in the 1960's, the first signs of impending manpower shortages had begun to surface—in 1967 there was a shortage of 125,000 production personnel in industry, and the total of workers and employees in the Soviet economy in 1970 fell some 1.7 million below targets projected earlier for that year by Soviet planners.[1] Although the manpower situation may not deteriorate too rapidly through the remainder of the 1970's, the Soviet Union—as will be shown—faces a sharp drop-off in the rate of growth of the working-age population in the 1980's—a decline which could act as a major constraint on the fulfillment of ambitious plans for future economic expansion.

Faced with these demographically determined trends, the Soviet government in recent years has taken a number of steps to make more rational use of the nation's vital human resources. Not the least of these has been the establishment, beginning in early 1967, of a network of administrative bodies at republic and lower levels to coordinate and maximize the utilization of labor resources. Through these new organizations, the authorities have sought to tap unused or underutilized reserves of labor, to bring into closer balance the demands for manpower and the supply of trained personnel turned out by the educational system, and to reduce the waste involved in excessive, uncontrolled turnover and migration of labor. On balance, these measures have edged toward greater control over the distribution and movement of labor, although it is still early to judge just how far the Soviet government is prepared to go in utilizing the new agencies to limit the generally free movement of labor that has been allowed since 1956, when World War II restrictions were finally lifted. Before examining some of the policies being implemented or tested for implementation by these agencies, it may be useful to enumerate briefly the major problems confronting them.

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Manpower Supply

The first problem—albeit the one least amenable to solution by the manpower agencies—is that of the gross supply of labor. The basic parameters of manpower supply are set by population growth, which in the Soviet case has suffered numerous demographic catastrophes—e.g., the estimated loss of 15 million males in World War II. As a result of these demographic factors, the growth of population in the working ages (16-59 for men and 16-54 for women), which should continue at a fairly steady

[1] The bulk of the statistical data underlying the present discussion may be found in Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the USSR," US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 485-563.

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pace for the remainder of the present decade, will slow markedly in the 1980's. The potential dimensions of this slowdown are shown in Table 1 on this page, which projects an absolute growth in working-age population during the 1980's equal to less than one-quarter of the growth in the present decade and also less than the low annual rate of growth of manpower in the early 1960's.

As that earlier dip in the growth of the working-age population became apparent, the regime began to take various steps to bolster the effective size of the labor force. In 1964 it dropped various financial penalties applying to persons of pension age who remained economically active and began to encourage pensioners to reenter the labor force. Today as many as 6 to 8 million persons of pension age are employed in the public sector or work on collective farms and private plots.[2] There has also been a parallel effort to encourage part-time work, but as recently as mid-1973 there were reportedly only 170,000 part-time employees in the Russian Republic.[3] While such sources of additional manpower are being continually explored by the new manpower agencies (see below), the main source of new labor in the Soviet Union will have to be the dwindling increments to the working-age population. For example, Soviet authorities expect this source to account for fully 92 percent of the increase in manpower in the years 1971-75.[4]

Problems of Distribution

Besides confronting the manpower authorities with the prospect of a serious shortage of working-age population in the 1980's, demographic trends also indicate that what growth there will be in this category of population will be unfavorably distributed geographically—*i.e.*, it will be concentrated primarily in Soviet Central Asia. Projecting population trends in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan, one finds that these republics will provide a dramatically increased share of the total growth of working-age population in the USSR. From one-quarter of the growth in this age-group in 1971-75 and one-third in 1976-80, these republics will account for 99.7 and 104.0 percent of the growth in 1981-85 and 1986-90, respectively (the last figure indicates that the remaining 10 republics will actually experience a decline in working-age population in the years 1986-90).[5] Moreover, a considerable portion of the increased manpower supply in the Central Asian republics will be concentrated in the rural parts of these less developed republics and hence will be relatively inaccessible.

Soviet manpower experts are aware of these sobering demographic facts. An account of a meeting on demography and manpower held at Alma-Ata in May 1973 stated:

In the 1980's, the growth of the able-bodied population will slow down. The contemporary utilization of labor resources is characterized by a deficit of labor force in many regions of the country and in many branches of the national economy. Nonetheless, in a number of regions of the country where there is a lower level of urbanization and a higher birth rate (Moldavia, the Central Asian republics, Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan) simultaneously with a deficit of skilled labor in industry, especially in complex production activities, there are significant surpluses of

Table 1: Growth of the Working-Age Population in the USSR, 1959-90: Estimates and Projections

(in thousands)

Plan period	Increase for period	Average annual increase
1959-65	5,173	739
1966-70	7,970	1,599
1971-75	12,849	2,570
1976-80	10,728	2,146
1981-85	2,944	589
1986-90	3,039	608

SOURCE: Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the Five-Year Plan," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973. Based on unpublished estimates and projections prepared by Godfrey Baldwin of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 502. V. Kogan reports that the number of old-age pensioners at work in Moscow increased from 78,000 out of a total of 647,000 pensioners in January 1964 to 256,000 out of a total of 994,000 in January 1970. See his contribution, "How Over-Aged Persons Relate to Participation in Socialized Production," in D. I. Valentei *et al.*, Eds., *Narodonaselenie: naselenie i trudovye resursy* (Population: Population and Labor Resources), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 72.

[3] A. Novitskii and M. Babkina, "Incomplete Work Time and Employment of the Population," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 7, July 1973, p. 135.

[4] Derived from L. A. Kostin and S. L. Kostin, *Vsemerno povyshat proizvoditelnost truda* (Increase Labor Productivity in Every Possible Way), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1971, p. 13.

[5] Feshbach and Rapawy, "Labor Constraints . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 492.

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labor resources in rural localities and in small and medium-sized cities. Social and economic policy in the area of labor resources must be directed toward a substantive improvement of their utilization.[6]

It is, of course, one thing to call—as this gathering did—for improved utilization of surplus rural labor, but it is quite another to accomplish the task. Particularly in Soviet Central Asia, efforts to bring the growing supply of potential manpower into the Soviet economic mainstream face enormous obstacles. To tap these human resources, the regime must mobilize and urbanize the rural populations and find them productive employment either in new industries developed in Central Asia or in jobs elsewhere in the Soviet Union, where manpower is in short supply. However, the Central Asian populations have proven quite resistant to such mobilization, even under the extreme pressures once exerted by Stalin. Central Asia, moreover, is not necessarily where the Soviet planners would choose to invest their scarce capital resources; yet any forced shift of Central Asian peoples to labor-deficit regions of the USSR would certainly encounter local resistance and at the same time would tarnish Moscow's image in the Third World.

Elsewhere in the Soviet Union, there appear to be no problems in attracting rural manpower to the urban-industrial complexes; on the contrary, a problem of a completely opposite nature poses itself—an excessive out-migration of young and/or skilled labor from the countryside. This rural exodus (discussed in detail by David Powell above) is leading to a serious aging of the rural labor force in many areas. Drawing heavily on this traditional source of industrial manpower would only aggravate matters and imperil regime attempts to increase rural output and productivity.

The skewed location of potential future labor resources and the problems of drawing on them and on more traditional rural sources of manpower represent only one aspect of the maldistribution of manpower in the Soviet Union. Skilled personnel continue to be turned out by schools and training institutions in quantities and skill profiles which do not necessarily fit the needs of the economy, and considerable training and worktime are being wasted as a result of these disparities as well as of uncontrolled decisions by individuals to change jobs and professions.

Two brief examples of the disarray in the training and distribution of skilled manpower should suffice to illustrate this point. The first involves the training and employment of engineers and skilled technicians. In the early 1960's, the Soviet authorities apparently became concerned with the heavy preponderance of engineers over technicians. Accordingly, a May 1963 decree prescribed that educational institutions should make it their goal to train 3 or 4 technicians for every engineer (reversing then current trends). Yet, in the RSFSR, the largest of the republics comprising the USSR, the number of engineer slots grew by 303,000 over the period 1960-68 compared to an increase of only 14,900 in technician slots. One possible explanation for this baffling disparity between training policy and the actual situation in industry may have been poor utilization of technicians. In 1965 there were 307,000 technicians working as "wageworkers" in industry (*i.e.,* in jobs not requiring a technician's skills), and by 1970 the figure had reached 613,000—or 28 percent of all technicians in Soviet industry.[7] This malutilization of skilled technicians has been particularly acute in the oil refining and ferrous metallurgy industries. According to a survey conducted by the USSR Central Statistical Administration in 1968, some 46 percent of technicians in the former industry and 40 in the latter were employed as simple wageworkers.[8]

A second example of maldistribution of skilled manpower involves technically trained personnel for the agricultural sector. The government has expended considerable effort and resources on raising the skill levels, and hence the productivity, of the rural labor force. Yet roughly half of all agricultural specialists with higher education (agronomists, veterinarians, etc.) have chosen to work outside of agriculture, while some 76 percent of engineers and

[6] A. Chernov, "The Demographic Situation and Labor Resources of the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 10, October 1973, p. 156. For further discussion of the problem of regional distribution, see L. Chizhova's contribution, "Regional Aspects of the Utilization of Labor Resources," in Valentei *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-27.

[7] See O. A. Deineko, *Kompleksnaia ratsionalizatsiia upravlencheskovo apparata* (Complex Rationalization of the Managerial Apparatus), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1972, pp. 40-41; and *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kultura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Public Education, Science, and Culture in the USSR. A Collection of Statistics), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 239.

[8] See F. M. Volkov, V. S. Nemchenko, and V. N. Yagodkin, Eds., *Vosproizvodstvo rabochei sily i povyshenie effektivnosti ispolzovaniia trudovykh resursov* (Reproduction of the Labor Force and Increasing the Efficiency of Utilization of Labor Resources), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Moskovskovo Universiteta, 1971, p. 228. The author is indebted to Prof. Warren W. Eason, Ohio State University, for making this source available.

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technicians specially trained for work in the fields of agricultural mechanization and rural electrification likewise have chosen to work elsewhere in the economy. As a result, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture reported that in 1970 only 146,000 out of 480,000 rural positions requiring engineers and technician-mechanics could be filled.[9] More drastic yet is the situation with regard to government efforts to increase the number of "mechanized cadres" (*i.e.*, farm machinery operators) in the Soviet countryside. Between April 1965 and April 1969, a total of some 3,578,000 "mechanized cadres" were trained in vocational-technical schools or in courses given on the farms. Yet the net increase of such personnel actually working on state and collective farms amounted to only 263,000, or roughly 7 percent of the total trained. Fully 77 percent went to work elsewhere in the economy or were drafted. The remaining 16 percent went to replace farm machinery operators who had died or retired, or who had spontaneously chosen to transfer to other occupations.[10]

Labor Turnover

The movement of skilled agricultural labor to other occupations suggested by the above statistics is, of course, only part of a major problem of labor turnover afflicting the Soviet economy. According to Soviet definition, the term "turnover" (*tekuchest*) applies to changes in personnel resulting from persons either quitting their jobs of their own volition or being fired for infractions of labor discipline, but it excludes changes resulting from workers being drafted into the armed forces, separated on old-age pensions, recruited by the government for priority projects, transferred to other enterprises at the direction of a superior organizational echelon in the worker's branch of industry, or released in order to give birth, to accompany a spouse to another location, or to enroll in full-time study. Some idea of the dimensions of the turnover problem in the USSR, can be derived from the following data for 1970. In that year, some 5.4 million persons, or 21 percent of all wageworkers in Soviet industry, were involved in turnover (another 9 percent changed jobs for "acceptable" reasons). This rate has remained quite constant since the initial flood of job changes in 1956 immediately following the abolition of constraints on free movement of labor (in that year turnover of industrial wageworkers was 38 percent).[11]

Of course, some movement of people to better jobs or to other jobs at the termination of short-term work contracts is both inevitable and desirable. However, the level of turnover suggested by the above statistics constitutes a serious degree of labor instability that hinders orderly economic planning. Soviet planners naturally would prefer to work with a relatively stable labor force possessing a known spectrum of skills in order to ensure fulfillment of capital construction and industrial production plans of individual enterprises and industries. Generally speaking, labor turnover causes considerable loss of work-time as well as decreased productivity both before and after personnel changes, and it often leads to a wasting of skills, inasmuch as changes in occupation accompany as many as 50 or 60 percent of job changes.[12] The problem of turnover is particularly acute in such high-priority areas of economic development as Siberia and the Far East, where the rates run about one-third higher than the national average.[13]

Despite these problems of excessive turnover and maldistribution of manpower, the Soviet labor market has continued to be largely a free market since 1956, when wartime laws making it a crime to leave one's job without official permission were rescinded.[14] "Direct hire"—*i.e.*, the laying-on of

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 232, and V. A. Krinitskii, "Technical Reequipment of Agriculture and Problems of Engineering Cadres," *Doklady i soobshcheniia NIIESKh* (Moscow), Issue 64, 1972, pp. 94-95. The latter is a publication of the Scientific-Research Institute for Agricultural Economics.

[10] Compare *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* (USSR National Economy in 1969—other volumes of the Soviet statistical yearbook will be identified as *Nar. khoz.*, with the year indicated), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, pp. 427 and 535, with *Nar. Khoz., 1968*, p. 565. The breakdown on where the newly-trained "mechanized cadres" went is derived from A. Zalevsky, "More Fully Utilize Labor Resources," *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva* (Moscow), No. 4, April 1972, p. 68.

[11] G. S. Savosin, *Tekuchest kadrov: prichini i preduprezhdenie* (Personnel Turnover: Its Causes and Prevention), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1971, p. 28. According to Savosin's data, turnover in construction in 1970, while lower than in most years since 1956, still involved 31.6 percent of wageworkers in this sector.

[12] Murray Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR: A Survey of Recent Trends and Prospects," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part 3, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 730.

[13] Ye. Antosenkov, "How to Choose Work," *Trud* (Moscow), March 7, 1974, p. 2.

[14] For the text of the April 25, 1956, decree, see I. M. Sakharova *et al.*, Eds., *Sbornik zakonodatelnykh aktov o trude* (Collection of Legislative Acts Concerning Labor), 3rd rev. and expanded edition, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Yuridicheskoi Literatury, 1960, pp. 86-88.

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Soviet workers scanning the ubiquitous wall bulletin boards in search of an attractive job offer or a good bargain.

—London Daily Express via Pictorial.

workers through direct negotiation between enterprises and individuals—consistently accounted for over 90 percent of recruitments of ordinary wage-workers in industry throughout the 1960's. The remainder came from "organized recruitment"— *i.e.*, the recruitment of individuals for specific jobs by government agencies (since 1967 under the aegis of the state committees for labor resource utilization)—or from work assignments handed out to graduates of vocational-technical schools.[15]

This last channel of recruitment is part of the single most significant exception to the rule of free movement of manpower in the Soviet Union. Approximately 70 percent of Soviet young people beginning their work careers either find or are assigned jobs "in a planned manner." [16] Most persons leaving schools at whatever level are assigned their first job by a specific authority (either in the school or in the community government) for a specific period. In the higher schools and specialized secondary schools, "commissions for the individual distribution of specialists" assign graduates to specific jobs for three years. Graduates of vocational-technical schools get assignments ranging in duration from two to four years depending on the nature of their training. Those graduating from or leaving lower schools are assigned to jobs or are assisted in finding jobs by local agencies, usually those of the state committees for labor resources utilization, according to a quota system organized by branch of the economy and industrial branch.[17] However, this system often breaks down. As already suggested in the case of "mechanized cadres" for agriculture, many young people either do not report to their places of assignment at all or leave as soon as possible, for a variety of reasons—desires for higher pay, better living conditions, a more challenging professional life, etc.[18]

There is a basic contradiction in the Soviet approach, between the commitment to planned economic growth and the simultaneous desire to derive the benefits of initiative and free enterprise in the labor market. Enterprises seeking to maximize profits under the economic reforms introduced since 1965 are anxious to recruit skilled, productive labor —and do so by "direct hiring." The central authorities, too, compete for manpower by establishing preferential pay scales for those willing to work in high-priority "hardship" jobs in Siberia, the North, or the Far East. In conditions of growing labor scarcity, this lively competition for manpower threatens to deprive other activities which the planners do not wish to see sacrificed. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the authorities may have become increasingly attracted to the idea of imposing tighter controls over spontaneous movements of labor.

Prior to 1966, no suitable organization existed to effect such controls where they might be deemed

[15] See Murray Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 725, and L. M. Danilov, Ed., *Dvizhenie rabochikh kadrov v promyshlennosti* (Movement of Wageworkers in Industry), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 39.

[16] A. Maikov, "Effectiveness of the Utilization and Training of Labor Resources," *Ekonomicheskie nauki* (Moscow), No. 12, December 1969, p. 2.

[17] See Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR . . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 737-39, and K. A. Novikov, Ed., *Normativnye akty po ispolzovaniiu trudovykh resursov* (Normative Acts Concerning Labor Resource Utilization), Moscow, Yuridicheskaia Literatura, 1972, p. 468.

[18] For example, during the period 1958-60, only 59 percent of engineers and 70 percent of technicians allocated by Gosplan of the RSFSR to enterprises located in the Buryat Autonomous Republic reported to work. See I. M. Zandanov, "On Means for Increasing the Supply of Specialist Cadres to the Buryat ASSR," *Voprosy trudovykh resursov v raionakh Sibiri* (Questions of Labor Resources in Siberian Districts), Novosibirsk, Izdatelstvo Sibirskovo Otdeleniia AN SSSR, 1961, p. 152.

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advisable. The State Committee on Labor and Wage Problems of the USSR Council of Ministers, created in 1955, generally restricted its activities to establishing wage rates and job norms;[19] it was not directly concerned with analyzing and managing the labor market as such. A variety of other organizations existed for the "organized recruitment" of manpower for priority projects, for the resettlement of labor, and for the assignment of school leavers and graduates, but there was no unified administrative machinery for coordinating these diverse activities.

This need was eventually met as a result of a December 1966 decree which established a network of "state committees for the utilization of labor resources" (*gosudarstvennye komitety po ispolzovaniiu trudovykh resursov*) in the 15 union republics.[20] Interestingly, the Soviet government decided not to create a parent state committee at the national level, preferring to leave coordination of the activities of the republic state committees to the labor Resources Department of the USSR State Planning Committee. This may have been indicative of the tentative mood in which the regime approached the question of tightening the restrictions on the free movement of labor (the provision for the new bureaucracy was actually buried in the December 1966 decree, which dealt mainly with increasing labor productivity). Or it may have reflected a decision that control of manpower would be more feasible and effective within the framework of the individual union republics.

A New Bureaucracy

In any event, the new state committees were clearly intended to be active participants in the shaping and controlling of the labor market. As outlined in early commentaries, the duties of the committees were to fall in six broad areas. First, they were to develop and effect measures for locating and utilizing labor reserves—*i.e.*, underemployed or unemployed manpower—in all branches of the economy. Second, they were to work out with ministries, agencies, and enterprises means for retraining and redistributing manpower between branches of industry, enterprises, construction sites, and regions to meet production needs. Third, they were to provide job information and placement services to the public. Fourth, they were to study and, in conjunction with planning and management organs, to develop proposals for utilizing able-bodied persons not currently employed. Fifth, the committees were to conduct organized recruitment and resettlement of wageworkers and to oversee fulfillment by enterprises of obligations toward such workers with regard to housing, everyday services and amenities, and production conditions. Finally, they were to participate in the development of plans for the location of new industrial construction, taking into account the rational employment of the able-bodied population in the public economy.[21]

The 15 state committees quickly began to take organizational shape along the indicated lines. In the RSFSR a State Committee for Labor Resource Utilization was established in February 1967. It included separate Administrations for the Redistribution and Retraining of Wageworkers, for Labor Resources, for Job Placement of the Population and Young Persons, for Organized Recruitment of Wageworkers, and for Resettlement, plus an Information Department.[22] Later in the year a Central Scientific Research Laboratory of Labor Resources was established under the RSFSR committee. Special units in Leningrad and in the Far East were also attached to the committee. By mid-1973 new bureaus for "Job Placement and Public Information on the Requirements of Enterprises, Construction Sites, and Organizations for Workers and Employees" had been established in 100 of the 129 cities of the Russian Republic having a population of 100,000 or more persons.[23] A Central Bureau of Job Placement and Public Information was established in Moscow, where it was planned to create an automated management system—"a central memory machine"—to collate information on job vacancies from the

[19] A. V. Piatakov, *et al.*, *Sbornik zakonodatelynkh aktov o trude* (Collection of Legislative Acts Concerning Labor), 2nd ed., Moscow, Yuridicheskaia Literatura, 1965, p. 22.

[20] The decree, entitled "On Measures for Securing Maximum Growth of Labor Productivity in Industry and Construction," is extracted in Novikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 5

[23] See V. Andreev, "With the Help of the Job Placement Bureau," *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* (Moscow), July 11, 1973.

[24] Novikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-11, and A. Larionov, "How the Labor Service Can Help an Individual and the State," *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), July 20, 1971, p. 2.

[25] Novikov, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

[26] A. Novitskii, "Additional Source for the Labor Force of the Services Sphere," in D. I. Valentei *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

[27] Andreev, "With the Help . . .," *loc. cit.*

[28] *Trud*, Feb. 2, 1972. Such use apparently contravened pre-Census promises.

[29] Volkov, Nemchenko, and Yagodkin, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

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bureaus throughout the republic.[24] To facilitate this effort, the RSFSR Council of Ministers had directed all enterprises and organizations in the republic to submit information on openings to the appropriate bureau.[25]

In addition to gathering information on job vacancies, the labor resource offices have assumed the direction of efforts to locate persons willing to work part-time or after retirement age and to find them jobs. A recent survey of 3,100 full-time students of higher or specialized educational institutions conducted by the RSFSR State Committee on Labor Resource Utilization revealed that one-quarter of the former and some 7-10 percent of the latter would work if part-time employment became available.[26] Based on these findings, it was deemed possible to add about 1,000,000 persons to the labor force (full or part-time) of that republic alone. In Ufa, the local Bureau for Job Placement and Population Information found jobs for 3,000 persons formerly engaged in household activities and for more than 3,000 others who were of pension age.[27] In Kaluga, the local bureau resourcefully made direct use of 1970 census data on the local population to contact and find jobs for persons not previously working.[28] The state committees have not restricted their search for underutilized manpower to the cities. In Belorussia the local committee in 1968 conducted a survey of some 305,000 collective farmers in the republic who worked less than 100 days per year on the collective fields in order to find out why they did not work more.[29]

The state committees for labor resource utilization have also become active in matters of vocational

The new manpower bureaucracy at work: this 1974 photo shows a bulletin board of the Bureau for Job Placement and Public Information of Moscow's Administration for Labor Resource Utilization, carrying the title "We Invite You to Work." In addition to numerous notices of job openings, the board carries, in the lower lefthand corner, an announcement of "Organized Recruitment of Workers for Enterprises and Construction Sites in Siberia, the Far East, and the Far North."

—Murray Feshbach.

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Table 2: Changes in RSFSR Worker and Employee Totals and Work of the New Job Placement Bureaus, 1966-72

Year	Workers and employees [a]	Increase from previous year	Placed by new job bureaus	Persons placed as % of increment
		(in thousands)		
1966	48,983	—	—	—
1967	50,315	1,332	160	12.0
1968	51,754	1,439	402	27.9
1969	53,287	1,533	537	35.0
1970	54,376	1,089	(n.a.) [b]	(n.a.) [b]
1971	55,770	1,394	ca.500	35.9
1972	57,071	1,301	650	50.0

[a] Annual-average data (excludes collective farmers and private sector).
[b] Not available.

SOURCE: Adapted from information in *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR* (The National Economy of the RSFSR), Moscow, Statistika, volumes for 1969 and 1972; A. Maikov, "Labor Resources and Labor Productivity," *Sotsialisticheskii trud* (Moscow), No. 10, 1971, pp. 10-11; A. Z. Maikov and P. A. Gureev, "Legal Bases of the Distribution of Labor Resources," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 3, 1971, p. 53; V. Andreev, "Man and His Work," *Trud* (Moscow), Aug. 25, 1972, and "With the Help of the Bureau of Job Placement," *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* (Moscow), July 11, 1973.

orientation. (As noted above, an important cause of turnover among young workers is the disparity between personal aspirations and available job opportunities.) The manpower groups are attempting to lower somewhat the aspirations of the many young people wanting to pursue specialties requiring higher education instead of entering production-worker trades. For example, the Latvian State Committee on Labor Resources Utilization has created a Department on Vocational Orientation and Job Placement of Young People and a republic Inter-agency Council on Vocational Orientation of Young People through which the department intends to coordinate the efforts of all ministries, agencies, enterprises, organizations, and secondary schools to meet the needs of the republic's economy for trained wageworkers.[30]

Beyond such efforts to collect and disseminate information and to channel currently nonemployed persons or youth into economic activity, the state committees are taking an increasingly active role in the distribution of existing manpower. Thus, in the RSFSR, the job placement bureaus have since 1967 (their first year of operation) placed a number of workers equal to between one-quarter and one-half of the year-to-year net increases in the average annual number of workers and employees in the republic (see Table 2). The Kaluga bureau mentioned above, between October 1970 and October 1972, succeeded in reducing the number of enterprises in the city with labor shortages from 23 to 7 and in decreasing the number with surplus manpower from 40 to 17.[31]

The manpower groups have also taken up the battle against at least one aspect of the major source of maldistribution; excessive turnover. A regulation adopted in Leningrad in May 1969 required each person fired for an infraction of labor discipline in one of the enterprises in the city to report to the then new Labor Resources Utilization Administration for assignment to a low-skill, low-pay job for a period of three months. Persons thus disciplined were not eligible for any enterprise bonuses and were to be assigned lower positions on the waiting list for new housing. If unreasonable job behavior continued, the individual would become liable to legal penalties under the regular "anti-parasite" laws, which provide for the imposition of sentences of up to one year at corrective labor or even in prison.[32] (In 1970, these laws were reaffirmed in a number of republics, and a new USSR Labor Code —effective January 1, 1971—reinforced the concept of punishing undisciplined workers and rewarding conscientious workers and employees.[33]) Early

[30] Ya. Pakaln, "Vocational Orientation of Young People," *Sotsialisticheskii trud* (Moscow), No. 8, August 1971, pp. 82-89. On the role of vocational orientation, see also Novikov, *op. cit.*, p. 547.

[31] Andreev, "With the Help . . .," *loc. cit.*

[32] A. Soloviov, "Not Merely by Persuasion," *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, March 17, 1970.

[33] On the anti-parasite legislation, see Feshbach and Rapawy, "Labor Constraints . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 543. The new Soviet Labor Code was published in *Osnovy zakonodatelstva Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublik o trude* (Basic Labor Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Izvestiia Sovetov Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia, 1970, p. 25.

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in 1970 the Moscow Administration on Labor Resources Utilization created a Public Commission on Job Placement in each of the city's boroughs or wards (*raioni*), and persons fired for infractions of work rules were "invited" to appear before these bodies. In the autumn of 1972 these quasi-official bodies, composed of deputies to the borough soviet, representatives of the administration itself, and figures from local economic and public organizations, acquired official status as an arm of local government controlling the job placement of all those fired for violation of labor discipline in the given borough.[34]

An even broader mandate was given to the city job placement bureau in Ufa and Kaluga in a two-year experiment that began in October 1970. These bureaus were given exclusive control over *all* new employment in their cities, not just the placement of labor-discipline violators.[35]

It is too early to judge the overall effectiveness of these measures or the extent to which they will be applied elsewhere in the USSR. However, early reports from Leningrad suggest that at least some of the more wasteful aspects of turnover have been reduced. It is reported that the number of *changes of occupation* involved in every 100 changes of job in the city has dropped from 56 to 24.[36]

Prospects

From this brief survey, it is clear that the new network of state committees and administrations for labor resource utilization have begun to attack manpower problems in a more systematic manner than that which prevailed in the decade from 1956 to 1966. The new committees have indeed been active, and to a measurable extent effective, in locating underutilized manpower resources, in helping channel needed manpower into priority projects, in combating turnover, in providing a pool of manpower research and information, in helping find jobs for those seeking them, and in encouraging inactive persons to enter the labor market. It is less clear how active the committees, or their coordinating link in the Gosplan hierarchy, have been in bringing to bear manpower considerations on national decisions concerning plant location or in seeing to it that enterprises show good faith in providing the work conditions, housing, and amenities promised to recruited labor.

As the complexities of the Soviet manpower situation increase, one may anticipate the creation of a single USSR state committee of cabinet-level ranking to coordinate the work of the 15 republic state committees for the utilization of labor resources. Hesitancy to take such a step may reflect continuing indecision over the proper degree of control to be exercised over the movement of labor in the Soviet Union. However, the various experiments in Leningrad, Moscow, Ufa, Kaluga, and elsewhere seem to suggest that while the severity of the 1940-56 regime is not likely to be restored, some further limitations on the freedom of movement of Soviet manpower may be in the cards. At least the machinery for such action is now in place.

[34] See K. Novikov, "Man, His Labor, the National Economy," *Trud*, June 27, 1970; and "On the Commissions for Labor Resource Utilization," *Biulleten Ispolnitelnovo komiteta Moskovskovo gorodskovo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia* (Moscow), No. 22, November 1972, pp. 23-25.

[35] Andreev, "With the Help . . .," *loc. cit.*, and *Trud*, Feb. 2, 1972.

[36] V. Andreev, "Man and His Work," *Trud*, Aug. 25, 1972.

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Peking and World Communism

By Joseph C. Kun

Twelve years after the first pro-Chinese splinter party appeared within an already disunited international Communist movement, charges that Maoist "splittism" and factionalism continue to endanger the forces of revolution remain very much a part of the Soviet-led campaign to discredit the Chinese before the rest of the world. A commentary broadcast by Radio Prague in January 1974 affords a typical example.[1] This commentary maintained that the central purpose of Maoist endeavors had been to create "a new center, a new international," which would subordinate to Chinese command militant but inexperienced revolutionary detachments, primarily in the developing world. The urge to make Peking the hub of revolutionary activity, the commentary declared, had consistently led the Maoists to try "to weaken and eventually destroy the international Communist movement and the world socialist system." When Maoist ideology alone had failed to undermine the more advanced Communist parties in the 1960's, it went on, Peking had resorted to destructive splintering techniques with the sole objective of spreading chaos and mistrust among the ranks of the revolutionary movement. Currently, Maoist tactics were aimed at the developing world, but the goal remained the same: the principle of inciting conflicts and maintaining a climate of permanent tension originated from "ideologists nurtured on the Confucian notion of China as the center of the world."

This analysis of Chinese intentions combines, either incidentally or by design, two separate themes regarding Chinese political activity. First, it suggests that the Chinese leadership persists in efforts to set up a new "center" or "international" headquartered in Peking. Second, it defines China's current primary target as the developing world and implies that the new "center" would serve to coordinate, under Chinese direction, revolutionary activity among the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (One should note here, however, that it depicts the prevailing Chinese concentration on the developing world as a phenomenon of fairly recent origin.)

Chinese interest in establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) as something of a *primus inter pares* among the countries of the developing world has been widely recognized by Western observers of the Communist scene, but these observers now tend to question the sincerity of Prague's (and, indirectly, Moscow's) expressions of serious concern about alleged Chinese attempts to establish Peking as the center of the Communist movement. A variety of changes that have taken place in China's internal and foreign policies during the last decade appear to have effectively excluded such a possibility. The Chinese leadership, which in the early 1960's *may have* entertained illusions about setting up a rival Communist movement with Peking as its

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[1] Commentary by Vladimir Till, Radio Prague Domestic Service, Jan. 27, 1974.

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coordinating center, seems to have abandoned that plan entirely. This article will explore in depth the present circumstances and the factors that have produced them.

The Early 1960's Communist Split

It should be made clear at the outset that the Chinese themselves have never said anything that could be taken as a proof that they ever in fact planned to establish a rival Communist center; however, the situation that existed in the international Communist movement in the early 1960's did look ripe for the formation of a new international, with Peking as its logical focal point. In the years after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, the political and ideological stances of the Soviet leadership under N. S. Khrushchev caused some parties in the international Communist movement, both ruling and nonruling, to question the validity of Soviet ideological positions. This became painfully clear at the two major Communist gatherings of 1960, the Romanian Party Congress in June and the Moscow meeting of 81 parties in November. With the emergence of parties that for the first time dared openly to support Peking's ideological position—and, consequently, to challenge those of the CPSU—the so-called monolithic unity of the world Communist movement was effectively shattered.

The parties that "rebelled" against Moscow's ideological domination in 1960 were a curious bunch. Some—the Burmese, Thai, and Malayan CP's—were small and relatively insignificant in the worldwide Communist context. Having long depended on the support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they came close to allying themselves fully with the CCP's political and ideological positions. Others—such as the North Vietnamese, North Korean, and Japanese CP's, as well as the then still powerful Indonesian CP—were not entirely won over by the Chinese but refused to go along with Moscow's anti-Chinese arguments, thereby placing themselves in a precarious situation vis-à-vis the CPSU. Still others—the "white" parties of Asia, *i.e.*, the New Zealand and Australian CP's—neither fully endorsed Peking's ideological stance nor completely rejected Moscow's views.

At this early stage, the only European ruling Communist party that cast its lot with Peking was that of Albania. Moscow revenged itself on the Tirana regime by openly "excommunicating" the Albanian leadership at the 21st Congress of the CPSU in October 1961—a move that signaled the beginning of the public ideological-political confrontation between the Chinese and Soviet parties that has generally come to be known as the Sino-Soviet conflict. An important side-effect of that conflict was the development of organizational splits within various parties in the international Communist movement and the subsequent appearance of full-fledged Marxist-Leninist (ML) groups and "parties," as opposed to mere dissident factions.[2]

The emergence of the splinter movement was encouraged by what appeared to be a Chinese master plan to undermine established parties by inciting opposition groups either to form separate factions or to set themselves up as *the* legitimate leaders of those parties. In a lengthy document published in June 1963, the Chinese made it clear that, in their view, "true" Marxist-Leninists in any given party had the inalienable right to reject and replace those leaders who followed a revisionist political line; moreover, they declared that the Marxist-Leninist minority was exempt from majority decisions as to what the "correct" line might be.[3]

This attempt to justify organizational splits was soon followed up by an effort to make factionalism and "splittism" a part of the ideological heritage of the world Communist movement. The Chinese innovation was introduced, ironically, by Chou Yang, one of the CCP's theoretical experts who less than three years later found himself purged for ideological deviations during the initial phases of the Cultural Revolution.[4] According to Chou Yang, it was an "inexorable law" that wherever revisionists had taken over established Communist parties (thereby "creating splits"), new revolutionary forces were bound to emerge under the leadership of outstanding Marxist-

[2] The process of pro-Chinese splintering, which became generally noticeable in mid-1963, actually began somewhat earlier. In February 1962, a Communist Party of Brazil with a pro-Chinese political platform came into being. Within a year of the new party's establishment, Peking recognized it as the sole legitimate Communist party in Brazil.

[3] "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the Communist Movement," June 14, 1963. The proposal was presented in the form of a letter from the Central Committee of the CCP in reply to a communication from the Central Committee of the CPSU. A full text appeared in *Peking Review*, June 21, 1963, pp. 6-22.

[4] Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," a speech delivered at the Fourth Enlarged Session of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences on Oct. 26, 1963. The text of the speech was first published in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Dec. 27, 1963.

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At the 45th anniversary celebration of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Djakarta, May 23, 1965: from the left, Chairman D. N. Aidit, First Vice-Chairman Lukman, and Second Vice-Chairman Njoto, of the PKI; P'eng Chen, of the Chinese Communist Party; Le Duc Tho, of the Vietnamese Workers' Party; Gogo Nushi, of the Albanian Party of Labor; and Satomi Hakamada, of the Japanese Communist Party.

—***China Pictorial*** **(Peking), No. 8, 1965, p. 6.**

Leninists and guide the movement along the "correct" Marxist-Leninist path.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Chinese theoretical justification of "splittism," pro-Chinese elements within the established Communist parties of a number of countries (namely, Belgium, Ceylon, Peru, and Australia) either began to organize separate Marxist-Leninist groups or sought to depict themselves as the representatives of the true Communists within those parties. During 1963-64, the voices of the newly-emerging splinter groups increasingly made themselves heard through the medium of Marxist-Leninist journals.[5] By the start of 1965, a total of 27 parties (including those of both the established and splinter varieties) had associated themselves with the Chinese in the ideological quarrel, while 69 remained in Moscow's camp.[6]

Peking's Intentions Reexamined

During the early 1960's, Peking's attitude toward the Marxist-Leninist parties was one of unqualified endorsement. The Chinese made no attempt to conceal their sponsorship of the splinter movement and called support of it an "international obligation." Moreover, the louder the Soviet leadership complained about anti-party and anti-Soviet factionalism, the more Peking encouraged such activity. Taking Soviet indignation as a sign of success, the Chinese in the spring of 1965 chastised themselves in a tongue-in-cheek manner for not having given sufficient backing to the splinter movement and promised greatly to intensify their endeavors in this respect.[7]

In view of China's open encouragement and sponsorship of the splinter movement, many observers began to suspect that the Maoists were indeed planning to set up a rival international with Peking as its center. The Russians did not hesitate to try to further this notion by accepting it as a fact. As early as October 1963, the CPSU's theoretical journal *Kommunist* spoke of a Chinese effort to "knock together an international bloc," [8] and in a report to a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee some four months later, M. A. Suslov charged: "The CCP

[5] By the end of 1963, such journals had appeared in 15 countries, mainly in Western Europe and Latin America.

[6] William McLaughlin, "Communist Parties of the World," Radio Free Europe, *Research* (Munich), March 11, 1965.

[7] Editorial Departments of *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Hung Ch'i*, "Comment on the March Moscow Meeting," in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 22, 1965.

[8] "Marxism-Leninism Is the Basis for the Unity of the Communist Movement," *Kommunist* (Moscow), Nov. 15, 1963.

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leadership is obviously working toward forming, under its aegis, something in the nature of a special international bloc and counterposing it to the world Communist movement. . . ." [9]

But now, a decade later, one may wonder whether the Chinese leaders, despite these promising beginnings, ever really intended to create such an "international bloc." None of the documents issued by Peking suggests readiness to make such a move; however, at the outset of 1966 there were some sporadic signs that individual parties within the splinter movement were trying to build up the CCP as the legitimate successor to the Soviet Communist Party, which in their eyes had fallen under the leadership of "Khrushchevian revisionists." In a number of speeches and publications, representatives of the Marxist-Leninist movement implied that the CCP was the "shock brigade" of the international Communist movement,[10] the "focal party" and the "leading party of Marxism-Leninism." [11] This line was perhaps most outspokenly expressed in a pamphlet stemming from a small pro-Chinese group in Argentina. The pamphlet clearly stated:

Only a party . . . such as the CCP can resist revisionism and be qualified to take the place abandoned by the present leadership of the CPSU, that is to say to take the place of the party of Lenin and Stalin.[12]

Almost as soon as these scattered professions of interest in the formation of a new international with the CCP at its hub appeared, however, they were overtaken by developments in Peking, for the new ideological line propounded by the Chinese at this time placed the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" above the party as such. To be sure, the most loyal members of the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement quickly adjusted their arguments to suit the revised line. As a prominent member of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) put it, "in our time the thought and work of Mao Tse-tung is the



In Mao's shadow—demonstrations by pro-Maoist elements in England and Japan in 1967: at top, British demonstrators praise Mao and denounce Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin during the latter's February visit to London; at bottom, Japanese militants read from "The Quotations of Mao Tse-tung" at an August rally.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

[9] "On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Solidarity of the International Communist Movement," Report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Feb. 14, 1964, in *Pravda* (Moscow), April 3, 1964.

[10] *Bandera Roja* (organ of the Peruvian CP), as quoted in *Peking Review*, April 15, 1966.

[11] E. F. Hill, "Why There Cannot Be Any Unity Between Marxist-Leninists and Modern Revisionists," *Vanguard* (organ of the Communist Party of Australia [Marxist-Leninist]), May 1966.

[12] Pamphlet by Elias Seman, Political Secretary of the Communist Vanguard of Argentina, as quoted in *Peking Review*, April 15, 1966.

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center of Marxism-Leninism, just as in their time Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin occupied the central position. . . ." [13] But not all segments of the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement proved so amenable, and this circumstance raises an important question: Did the Chinese leadership in fact plan to establish a rival center in Peking but wind up bungling the job in the mid-1960's when the splinter movement was at its peak?

One should bear in mind in this connection that while the Chinese had resorted to encouraging splits within the major established parties of the Communist movement because they evidently saw no hope of transforming these parties into pro-Chinese organizations, the Chinese obviously expected that the new Marxist-Leninist parties would eventually gain mastery of the revolutionary movements in their respective countries. Yet the mushrooming pro-Chinese parties confronted Peking with a variety of problems in the 1960's, some of which in the long run simply defied solution.

Most critical, the principle by which Chou Yang had sought to justify splits within Communist ranks soon came to be applied in ways which the Chinese probably did not originally anticipate, for in many instances the divisions did not end wth the splitting of the main "revisionist" party. "Splittism" turned out to be a maverick process; once it started, it was difficult to control. The splinter movement in Italy offers a good illustration. In 1965, the independent Italian CP (PCI) was still the sole Communist organization in the country; a year later, the PCI found itself challenged by four separate groups, of which the Italian Marxist-Leninist Movement was the most formidable. By the end of the 1960's, the latter, now known as the PCI (Marxist-Leninist) and recognized as the "official" pro-Chinese party,[14] shared the extreme-left end of the political spectrum with at least seven rival Marxist-Leninist groups and factions.[15] While the state of affairs in most other countries was not quit so complex, fragmentation of the splinter parties did become a phenomenon more or less characteristic of the entire pro-Chinese movement. In short, rather than stabilizing the ultra-leftist organizations tended to multiply through fission.

[13] Statement by P. Malone, Vice-chairman of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) in *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1966.

[14] The Communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist) was founded in October 1966.

[15] Kevin Devlin has surveyed this Italian "labyrinth" in "Lonely Revolutionaries: the Pro-Chinese Groups of Western Europe," Radio Free Europe, *Research*, Feb. 25, 1970.

It is important to remember, too, that Khrushchev's disappearance from the political scene in October 1964 presented a new opportunity for the Chinese and Soviet parties to settle their differences —an opportunity that dictated circumpection on Peking's part. During the weeks following Khrushchev's ouster, the two sides did in fact make some cautious moves toward reconciliation; however, the insistence of the new CPSU leaders on going ahead with the international conference that Khrushchev had proposed soon indicated to the Chinese the futility of expecting substantive concessions from Moscow.

The sudden escalation of the Vietnam war in February 1965 with the initiation of the bombing of North Vietnam and the subsequent Soviet call for a united stand of the two parties in support of the Hanoi regime temporarily revived the possibility of a renewal of cooperation in at least the political field. Yet the Chinese in fairly short order decided to close the door entirely on rapprochement and firmly rejected the Soviet appeal.

These considerations would suggest that if Peking genuinely contemplated the creation of a new international under its aegis, inadvertent mistakes probably do not account for its failure to put one together. In the final analysis, rational calculations and concerns in all likelihood dissuaded the Chinese from trying to do so.

The Decline of Chinese Influence

In retrospect, the CCP's spurning of Moscow's overtures for united action in the Vietnam crisis marked the onset of a drop-off in Chinese influence over the most militant and most violently anti-American (and therefore most pro-Hanoi) elements of the Left, many of whom had up to then viewed China as the main source of revolutionary élan in the world Communist movement. The Chinese leadership's shrill attacks on all attempts to promote cooperation with the so-called "revisionist" parties cost the CCP a great deal of support among parties that had formerly endorsed its ideological-political platform. For example, they managed to alienate such heretofore pro-Chinese parties as the North Korean and the Japanese. The North Vietnamese Communists, who had the most to lose in the process, were forced, for obvious reasons, to remain silent during the futile debate. Disillusionment with the Chinese was particularly evident in the representation of foreign

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Communist parties at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March 1966.[16]

Other factors, however, also played a role in the decrease of Chinese influence. In the mid-1960's, the parties that had allied themselves with China in the ideological sphere began to grow conscious of the drawbacks stemming from that alliance. One issue that created strains was Peking's insistence that all parties accept violent revolution as the only means of gaining authority. The Maoists maintained that the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of issues by means of war, was the highest form of revolution; moreover, they held that "this Marxist-Leninist principle of the revolution had a *universal validity,* applying equally to China and for all other countries. . . ." [17] Although it has never been proved that China was directly involved in the ill-fated coup in Indonesia in September-October 1965, there is no doubt that the Chinese leaders did nothing to prevent their Indonesian comrades from resorting to violent revolution—an effort that resulted in the virtual elimination of the largest and most influential Communist movement in non-Communist Asia. Memory of the Indonesian fiasco may well have played a major part in the JCP's refusal in early 1966 to engage in violent revolutionary actions in Japan in accordance with Chinese recommendations.

While the Chinese failed to persuade the independent JCP to engage in a guerrilla-type people's war, they were in a better position to sway the smaller and more dependent parties of Southeast Asia. During the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), and particularly in the period just before the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969, the theory and practice of people's war were enthusiastically endorsed by the Burmese, Thai, and Malayan parties and by remnants of the Indonesian CP holding out in the jungles of Borneo. These parties, directed from headquarters within China, likewise displayed total subservience to the Chinese ideological line and the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Shadow armies such as the Thai People's Liberation Army, the Indonesian People's Armed Forces, and the Burmese People's Armed Forces declared their readiness to "study and grasp Mao Tse-tung's thought [and to] develop people's war extensively," and their determination to fight to the end against local enemies such as the "US-Thai reactionaries" in Thailand, the "Suharto-Nasution fascist regime" in Indonesia, etc.[18] But the lack of visible gains against the existing governments and Peking's downplaying of the people's war theory even prior to the purge of Lin Piao and his followers in the fall of 1971 generated serious conflicts within some Southeast Asian parties over the validity of the Chinese pattern of violent revolution as applied to their own countries.

Another source of tension lay in the Chinese leadership's decision in the mid-1960's to enforce stricter discipline among its ideological allies. Anything other than unconditional acceptance of the Chinese line often led to a party's being disowned and denounced by the Maoists in Peking. The best-known example of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of an ally came to light through the polemics between the CCP and the Japanese Communist Party that commenced during the Cultural Revolution.

In the early 1960's, the Japanese CP, long exasperated by the factional activities of pro-Soviet splinter groups outside its ranks, had increasingly moved closer to the Chinese ideological line and consequently away from that of the CPSU; however, a disagreement over some important political issues was enough to convince Kenji Miyamoto and the "mainstream" leadership of the JCP that Chinese methods of dealing with allies differed little from those of the Soviets.

At the beginning of 1966, Miyamoto and Chinese leaders conducted a series of talks which climaxed in a meeting with Chairman Mao in late March. These ended in an atmosphere of discord that was soon to mar the relations of the two parties. Not only did the Japanese object to being pressured to engage in people's war in Japan, but they also differed with the Chinese over the merits of exploring avenues of united action with respect to Vietnam and the desirability of heaping abuse on the new leaders of the CPSU. These differences prompted Mao to insist on scrapping a final communiqué

[16] Only the Albanian, New Zealand, Japanese, Burmese, Malayan, and Thai parties followed Peking's lead in boycotting the gathering. See Kevin Devlin, "A Movement Transformed: Some Consequences and Lessons," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1966, pp. 49-51.

[17] Chi Yung-kung, "Never Forget the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Peking Review,* Sept. 26, 1969.

[18] Of the numerous articles that appeared during this period, see, for instance, "Burmese People's Armed Struggle—A Red Flag for People's Revolution," *Peking Review,* Jan. 12, 1968; "North Kalimantan People's Revolutionary Armed Forces Getting Stronger in Battle," *ibid.,* Jan. 24, 1969; "Thai People's Armed Struggle Develops Swiftly and Vigorously," *ibid.,* Feb. 21, 1969.

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already worked out by the two parties.[19] Subsequently, JCP leaders found themselves labeled—initially by Red Guard groups and later by official CCP sources—as "renegades" and traitors to Marxism-Leninism. Soon afterward, pro-Chinese elements within the JCP's ranks sparked splits, first, in a number of mass organizations associated with the party and, eventually, within the party proper. The ultimate outcome of these machinations was the founding in December 1967, with Peking's blessing, of a pro-Chinese splinter party, the Japanese Communist Party (Left).

Chinese treatment of the JCP, it should be pointed out, had an adverse effect on Peking's relations with the two ruling parties of the East Asian region that had previously demonstrated sympathy for Chinese ideological positions: the North Korean and the North Vietnamese. Both of these parties had earlier signed joint communiqués with the JCP proclaiming the necessity of united action in regard to Vietnam.[20] Without indulging in open polemics with Peking, they continued to retain friendly relations with the Miyamoto-led "mainstream" of the JCP, thereby endorsing the party's independent stand vis-à-vis Peking and condemning Chinese-inspired splitting. The two were soon joined by another ruling party—this time in Europe. A JCP delegation visiting Bucharest in June 1966 received warm support from the Romanians for its demands for equality and noninterference by big parties, be it the Soviet CP or the Chinese CP, in the internal affairs of other parties.

The unorthodox policies of the Cultural Revolution, too, had a negative effect on the CCP's relations with some of the parties that had initially endorsed China's independent political line. The extreme manifestations of the Maoist personality cult, the purges, and the virtual destruction of the party machinery all contributed to the alienation of important parties—notably, the North Korean, North Vietnamese, and the Japanese—that had already indicated reservations about certain Chinese policies. While some of the remaining pro-Peking forces, such as the Albanians and a variety of splinter parties in Western Europe and Latin America, responded to the peculiarities of the Cultural Revolution period with a display of added revolutionary fervor, there were some dropouts as well, the most outstanding being the secessionist Communist Party of Belgium led by Jacques Grippa.[21]

Decreasing Chinese Interest

On the whole, during the period of the Cultural Revolution the worldwide pro-Chinese movement appeared to be carried along by its own momentum. When not engaged in factional infighting, its representatives were busy organizing sit-ins and demonstrations on behalf of Hanoi, mainly in support of the ultraleft fringe of the student movement in Western Europe and the United States. But China's emergence from the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 did not witness the revival of any notable inclination to assert Chinese direction over the movement.

This new phase in Chinese foreign policy was characterized by an effort to establish good working

Chairman Mao Tse-tung shakes hands with US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during a November 12, 1973, meeting at Chungnanhai.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 1, 1974, p. 4.

[19] The story of Miyamoto's talks with the Chinese leadership and Mao's decision not to issue a joint communiqué was first revealed by *Akahata* (Tokyo), Jan. 24, 1967.

[20] Texts of the joint communiqués were published by the Vietnam News Agency and Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 28 and March 21, 1966, respectively.

[21] In early 1968, Grippa, perhaps inadvertently, came out in support of Liu Shao-ch'i, who had earlier fallen victim to the Cultural Revolution purges. The Chinese promptly abandoned Grippa's Belgian Communist Party and transferred their moral and material support to another body, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Belgium. Currently, the Chinese also recognize a relatively recent pro-Chinese group, the Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist).

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relations with countries more or less irrespective of their social and political systems. Its aim was to create an image of respectability and stability for the People's Republic of China by gaining recognition of the PRC government in Peking as the *sole* legitimate government of China and the PRC as *the only* Chinese state in the community of nations. By the end of 1972, Peking had established diplomatic relations with all but one member of the NATO military alliance, Portugal. It had even embraced the military junta in Athens and General Franco's government in Spain, both of which, although recognized by the majority of the East European Communist regimes, remained on the reject list of the most militant Communist states such as Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The most important development, however, was the normalization of the PRC's relations with the United States, a process that climaxed with President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972.

Peking's eagerness to set up ties with as many countries as possible coincided with a perceptible decline in Chinese preoccupation with the problems of the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement. Indeed, the dramatic announcement of Dr. Kissinger's secret mission to Peking in July 1971 and the events set in motion by that trip placed the pro-Chinese parties in a somewhat awkward situation. Having for many years drawn inspiration from Peking's irreconcilable attitude toward US imperialism, they could hardly discard their hatred of the United States and all that it stood for on a moment's notice. China's neglect to warn them of the impending change in its attitude made the shock especially difficult to bear.

All this served to accelerate a trend that had first become noticeable in the late 1960's: Albania's gradual assumption of the sponsorship of the splinter movement. The Albanians in 1969 showed signs of serious alarm at the possibility of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation when Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin paid a surprise visit to Peking in September 1969 and Sino-Soviet border talks opened soon afterwards. Since they had a great deal to lose from a reconciliation between Moscow and Peking, the Albanian leaders wasted no time in pointing out both the impermissibility of making concessions to modern revisionism and the danger of falling into a trap when attempting to do so.[22] Their insistence on "being more Catholic than the Pope," as well as their uncompromising attitude toward both US imperialism and Soviet "modern revisionism," appealed strongly to splinter parties disillusioned by what these parties felt to be Peking's vacillation in opposing Soviet revisionism. Tirana thus began to exhibit attractiveness as an alternative coordinating center. Marxist-Leninists of Western Europe and Latin America, who had earlier considered Peking their Mecca, now made more and more frequent visits to the Albanian capital.

One can trace the shift in the inspirational focus of the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement through the behavior of foreign delegates at key gatherings in Albania in 1969-71. As China's foremost ideological ally, the Albanians had throughout the 1960's maintained close contact with the various Marxist-Leninist splinter parties, especially those in Western Europe; in fact, the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) in November 1966 had attracted representatives from 24 such parties and groups. In November 1969, 22 Marxist-Leninist delegations attended the 25th-anniversary celebrations of the Albanian regime, and a number of them publicly hailed the APL as "the greatest inspiration for Marxist-Leninists in the world," an accolade heretofore reserved for the CCP and Mao Tse-tung's thought.[23]

The Sixth Congress of the APL in November 1971 marked a decisive turning point. Not only did the foreign representatives there find no Chinese delegation present (for some unknown reason), but they also had to confront other evidence of Chinese disregard for their sensitivities. At the end of October, active preparations had gotten under way for President Nixon's forthcoming visit to China. Then on November 15 a PRC delegation had taken a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. The capstone came, however, with the announcement of the arrival in Peking of a delegation of the "revisionist" Communist Party of Spain (PCE), led by Secretary General Santiago Carillo, while the Sixth Congress was still in session in Tirana.[24] This delegation's sojourn in China constituted something of a milestone,

[22] The first indications of Albanian concern over China's possible interest in seeking a rapprochement with the USSR appeared in articles published in *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), Oct. 8 and 13, 1969.

[23] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1969. See also Peter H. Prifti, *Albania Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Studies, MIT, 1970, pp. 25-26.

[24] The Carillo delegation's visit was first disclosed by the Chinese in a New China News Agency dispatch of Nov. 17, 1971. The delegation, which had toured Peking, Yenan, Canton, and Shanghai, was later received by Keng Piao, Director of the CCP's International Liaison Department. According to the report, Keng Piao "had a frank conversation with [members of the delegation] in which the two sides expressed their respective stands and views."

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for it was the first time since April 1965 that the CCP had displayed a willingness to discuss inter-party relations with representatives of a "revisionist" nonruling party. The coincidence of events did not pass unnoticed by the participants in the Tirana gathering. Raul Marko, the delegate of the pro-Chinese Spanish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), openly denounced Carillo as a "renegade" from Marxism-Leninism, and without referring directly to the Spanish CP delegation's presence in Peking, he charged that by "traveling from one country to another," Carillo and his comrades were trying to solicit "bombastic declarations from various organizations and personalities." He went on to warn those playing host to Carillo that they should realize that their reception of the latter served only "to make them ridiculous in the eyes of the Spanish people, who see in him an agent of the oligarchy." [25] (Since the visit of the PCE delegation in November 1971, the Chinese have not disclosed any further contacts with revisionist parties; however, one such party, the Partido Communista de Mexico, claims to have reestablished relations with the CCP, a statement yet to be confirmed by Peking.[26])

Evidence of Peking's declining interest in the Marxist-Leninist movement has mounted steadily over recent years. Since 1971, Chinese theoretical publications have carried no articles that could be taken as organizational guidance for parties of the splinter movement. Similarly, theoretical articles dealing with the problems of the Communist movement in general have also completely disappeared from the pages of the Chinese press. Indeed, the Chinese have totally ignored the issue that has occupied the attention of most Communist parties of the world since late 1973—the question of convening an international Communist conference. Peking's silence on the matter has contrasted sharply with the behavior of the Albanian regime: as early as February 1974, the Albanian Communists condemned the preparations and pointed to the anti-Chinese coloration that any such gathering under Soviet auspices would have.[27]

A further sign of Peking's declining interest in the Marxist-Leninist movement has been the small

Chairman Mao Tse-tung chats with V. G. Wilcox, General Secretary of the Communist Party of New Zealand, in Peking on March 12, 1967, during one of the latter's many visits to the PRC.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 5, 1967, p. 1.

number of Marxist-Leninist parties and groups that have visited the Chinese capital. During the five years between the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969 and the 25th-anniversary celebrations of the PRC in October 1974, the Chinese received only 32 such delegations.[28] Moreover, this figure included five separate visits by the Australian Marxist-Leninist E. F. Hill, four by New Zealand CP leader V. G. Wilcox, and two by the Chairman of the British CP (Marxist-Leninist), Reg Birch. The visits revealed no visible pattern except for the fact that no Marxist-Leninist delegation entered Peking in the first half of 1972, *i.e.*, at the height of the normalization process between the United States and the People's Republic.

The treatment that the Chinese have accorded the Marxist-Leninist delegations that they have entertained has also been indicative of Peking's attitude toward them. Of all 32 delegations, only four—those which attended the 20th-anniversary celebrations in October 1969—were received by Chairman Mao. The import of this figure becomes clearer if one notes that during the same period the Chairman met more than 50 political personalities from various

[25] Speech by Raul Marko, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), at the Sixth Congress of the APL, in *Zeri i Popullit*, Nov. 7, 1971.

[26] A communiqué of the PCM to this effect was quoted by Agence France Presse from Mexico City, Aug. 12, 1972.

[27] "Meeting of Revisionist Parties—Meeting Against Revolution and Communism," *Zeri i Popullit*, Feb. 14, 1974.

[28] A breakdown of the visits by year reveals that seven came in 1969; two, in 1970; five, in 1971; four, in 1972; eight, in 1973; and six, in the first nine months of 1974. By way of comparison, China entertained 33 Marxist-Leninist delegations during the first three years of the splinter movement (1963-65), and Mao himself received 14 of these groups.

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capitalist and developing countries, including politicians not currently in power, such as former Prime Minister Edward Heath of Great Britain. During the same five-year period, the Chinese have published no speeches of or conversations with visiting Marxist-Leninists, and they have issued no communiqués with such guests. Finally, the reception and entertainment of foreign Communists of this kind has frequently been left to members of the radical wing of the Politburo, who, unlike the pragmatists, seem to have retained a substantial interest in the Marxist-Leninist movement.[29]

All this is not to say that the Chinese have wholly forgotten the Marxist-Leninist movement. For example, greetings and messages from foreign Marxist-Leninist parties and groups continue to be published in the party press on occasions such as party congresses and state anniversaries. But few of the parties thus mentioned have actually sent delegations to Peking, and each new list of messages reveals fresh rifts and further instances of splintering in the Marxist-Leninst movement.

Conclusions

This brief outline of the history of the pro-Chinese splinter movement in the 1960's and the twists in China's own relationship with that movement leads to a number of conclusions. First, the inherent weakness of the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties, particularly those in the advanced industrial nations, may have convinced Peking that they cannot successfully challenge the "revisionist" forces in their respective countries; conversely, Peking's former ideological allies may view the PRC's attempts to gain respectability in the community of nations and its apparent determination to achieve a leading position among the countries of the developing world as a reversal of the CCP's earlier role as the leader of the worldwide Marxist-Leninist movement. The Chinese leaders' insistence that the PRC is a member of the developing world as well as a socialist country has raised doubts about their sincerity on both counts. Having found an alternate sponsor in the Albanian regime, the parties of the Marxist-Leninist movement are no longer likely to envisage the establishment of a new "center" in Peking.

Second, the growing influence of the "revisionist" Communist parties in a number of industrialized countries of the world (a trend that has occurred despite Peking's subversive efforts) has rendered them immune to any challenge from the radical Communist splinter movements in their respective countries. At the same time, their ability to demonstrate their independence from the CPSU has increased with every passing year. This latter development has made it unlikely that the Soviet leadership would try to reestablish Moscow as the coordinating center of the international Communist movement.

Third, the Chinese, having formally renounced the idea of a "Soviet camp," appear to have discounted Moscow's long-run ability to retain its leading role among its Communist allies. While the Chinese may never seriously have considered establishing Peking as an alternative center from which to coordinate the activity of the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties, the above circumstances have, on the whole, eliminated the necessity of creating such a center—as well as the need for a rival movement to challenge Moscow's weakening hold on the increasingly independent-minded parties of the international Communist movement.

[29] The task of receiving and entertaining foreign party delegations formally belongs to the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee under Keng Piao; however, during the past five years, members of the radical wing of the Politburo have been holding talks with Marxist-Leninist delegations visiting Peking.

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Books

New Light on the Soviet Elite

By T. H. Rigby

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG; *The European Administrative Elite.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973.
MICHAEL MOROZOW: *Das sowjetische Establishment.* Stuttgart, Seewald, 1971.

A DECADE or so ago, the study of Soviet government and politics seemed a declining industry, with scholars finding it more and more difficult to extract anything fresh and interesting from the available, already well-worked lodes of information. Now, however, the wheels are once more humming merrily. This revival is due, in part, to the application of traditional "sovietological" approaches to important new sources of information, notably *samizdat* materials, documentary collections and historical studies by Soviet scholars, and the newly legitimated researches of Soviet sociologists. Far more, however, it has resulted from the application to the old sources of fresh approaches that have uncovered important new facts or, more often, illuminated known facts by placing them in more revealing perspectives. These approaches, whose exponents include both younger scholars entering the field and established specialists who have set off to raid other intellectual traditions in search of fresh insights, may be classified under three headings, as outlined below.

1. *Historical.* What is new here is not, of course, the historical approach itself but the fact that a heightened puzzlement concerning certain persistent features of Soviet reality has moved many scholars to set out on a search for origins. This has prompted not only studies of critical junctures in Soviet history and of the development of particular aspects of the system, but also a renewed interest in the pre-1917 society and polity from which the Soviet system emerged.

2. *Comparative.* Reacting against the widespread *sui generis* assumptions of the past, many scholars have sought new insights through comparison of the USSR with other political systems. *What* has been compared has ranged from such highly specific aspects as political elites and leadership to more abstract (usually functionally-oriented) categories such as "political culture." The universe of comparison has likewise varied from—at the conservative extreme—comparison of Communist-led countries with one another (hence "comparative communism"), through comparison of single-party or autocratic polities generally, to—at the other extreme—comparison of modern or modernizing countries irrespective of formal political structure. The universe of comparison chosen has depended, at least implicitly, on the categories of political and social systems recognized (*e.g.*, "mobilization system," "bureaucratic regime," "industrial society," and so on). And like "totalitarianism," which was virtually the only concept for organizing such comparisons in the past, these categories tend to incorporate ideological as well as scientific criteria.

3. *Methodological.* This term is used to embrace both techniques of analysis, such as more refined and rigorous procedures for the examination of quantitative data, and concepts employed for the selection and interpretation of data. The latter, borrowed in large part from other fields of study, range from well-established political-science concepts (*e.g.*, "interest groups"), through concepts generated by newer functional or systemic models (such as political "articulation" and "aggregation"), to concepts evolved in such related disciplines as organization theory or social psychology (*e.g.*, "role," "socialization," etc.).

These, then, are the main directions sovietologists have been taking to restore the productivity of

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their craft. Of course, while analytically distinct, the new approaches have often been combined in practice. Each, to be sure, has its own dangers. Historical analysis can be a substitute for explanation, or it can degenerate into sterile arguments over "continuity" and "change." Sometimes we may try to compare the incomparable, or while comparing like with like, we may lose sight of the differing contexts that give meaning to the aspects compared. Methodology becomes mere self-indulgence if allowed to dominate our interest. Moreover, no amount of intellectual rigor or statistical sophistication can prevent us from talking nonsense if our knowledge of the country is insufficient. While we cannot claim to have always avoided such dangers, the new approaches are nevertheless getting us somewhere, not only in terms of a deepened understanding of the Soviet system, but also in terms of the greater contribution they enable sovietologists to make to political studies generally.

THE WORK OF John Armstrong provides an excellent illustration of these trends. Having played a major part in earlier sovietological research, notably through his *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, Praeger, 1959) and *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York, Random House, 1961), he deliberately set out in his latest book to combine all three of the approaches outlined above—the historical, the comparative, and the methodological—and has thereby produced a work rich in information and insights for students of a wide range of problems and areas. That he has avoided both the dangers mentioned above and the risks of diffuseness and shapelessness to which the sheer scope of his research exposed him must be credited to the consistent and disciplined focus of his analysis.

The European Administrative Elite is concerned with high-level officials in France, Britain, Prussia-Germany, and Russia-USSR from the early modern period (17th-18th centuries) to the present day. Specifically, Armstrong's topic is the way the roles of these officials have been perceived, by themselves and other relevant social elements, particularly in relation to economic development. He shows how these perceptions relate to general elite culture and how they are acquired and transmitted through primary socialization, formal education, induction into the administrative hierarchy, and experience therein. He throws much light on questions of continuity and change, a point to which we shall recur later. One should add that Armstrong does not show (nor does he tacitly assume) that favorable elite role-perceptions have historically constituted either necessary or sufficient conditions for economic development. Few, however, would contest his view that nowadays such favorable role-perceptions can scarcely be dispensed with; therefore, his findings possess considerable policy interest.

Armstrong's important work will undoubtedly receive elsewhere the comprehensive critical evaluations it deserves. What seems most appropriate here is to single out some of the points that seem to this reviewer to be of particular interest to students of the USSR.

First, some parallels and contrasts. One marked feature of Russian administration has been the salience of prefectural roles, before the Revolution in the form of provincial governors and now in the form of obkom secretaries. This feature is shared by France, but not by Germany, where prefectural roles have been relatively weak, or by Britain, where they have been nonexistent. A second feature common to both pre- and post-revolutionary Russia and France is the relative heterogeneity of their administrative elites, especially with respect to education and professional orientation, in contrast to the persistent dominance of the jurist in Germany and the liberally-educated "all-rounder" in Britain. It is true that

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over the last generation a single type has achieved a substantial degree of dominance in both France and the USSR, but whereas in France the dominant type has been the graduate of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration with his management-cum-Keynesian-economics orientation, in the USSR it has been the engineer. Again, while the USSR is unique in this predominance of the engineer, imperial Russia long differed from Germany and Britain, and so too has France, in placing a positive value on technical training and providing substantial opportunities for technically trained officials to achieve high administrative posts. In France the concept of the "corps" has been one factor reinforcing the diversity of bureaucratic elite types, since the members of each "corps," though usually spread through several departments, are united by a distinctive pattern of socialization, ideology, and solidarity. This is a further respect in which Armstrong sees a substantial parallel with the USSR, where the relative infrequency of transfers between careers in high-level economic management, the central party machine, and the provincial party-state administration has tended to develop a corps-like sense of shared identity among the officials employed in each of these individual areas.

These observations open up fresh perspectives for sovietologists, who, perhaps influenced by vestiges of the totalitarian model, have hitherto tended to focus comparisons between the Soviet Union and Western countries on Germany.[1] As the political and administrative concomitants of personal tyranny recede further into history in both Russia and Germany, we should be better able to attempt comparisons—as Armstrong has done—that bring out deeper and more persistent tendencies.

A second general point of interest is that the Soviet administrative elite emerges very well from Armstrong's analysis of the factors contributing to the formation of elite role definitions that favor active intervention of behalf of economic development. The author identifies five such factors, which he sees as in some degree substitutable: namely, metropolitan influence, territorial experience, administrative integration, a scientific-technological education component, and systematic economics training. Space is lacking to set forth the details of his argument, but Armstrong concludes that "Soviet administrative elite role definition is near optimal for all factors" (p. 309). Of course, he recognizes that such elite role definitions constitute only one component in a complex pattern of ideological, social, and political conditions that affect economic development performance, but in Soviet circumstances, in which nonadministrative paths to development have been blocked off, favorable administrative role definitions, backed up by the powerful impulse of Marxism-Leninism toward developmental intervention, have obviously been crucial.

Whether they will continue to be adequate, however, is a question left open in Armstrong's analysis. In terms of his modified Rostowian periodization,[2] the USSR is only now passing from the industrialized to the post-industrial stage, which the three other countries entered a generation ago. This transition could drastically change not only the relative impact of factors positively affecting administrative role perceptions (*e.g.*, managerial-economic as against scientific-technological training), but also—and more fundamentally—the responsiveness of the socioeconomic system to administrative manipulation. Certainly, the Soviet leadership has achieved little success to date in its essentially administrative measures to overcome the economic and technological lag.

Another respect in which the Soviet Union scores well in Armstrong's analysis is the relative egalitarianism of access to the administrative elite. While the three West European countries studied have substantially broadened their bases of recruitment to top administrative positions, those who attain such positions are still drawn largely from among persons recruited into special elite categories at the commencement of their careers, under conditions that give special advantages to young men of higher social background. Armstrong does refer to the importance of "connections" in Soviet career-making, but he suggests that high-level Soviet officials tend to use these to secure members of their families high-status positions *outside* rather than inside the administration. Important changes may, however, be occurring in this aspect of Soviet

[1] Two outstanding exceptions to this generalization are Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, Viking Press, 1964, and Jerome M. Gilison, *British and Soviet Politics: Legitimacy and Convergence*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.

[2] Walt W. Rostow, in his influential *The Economics of Takeoff into Sustained Growth*, New York, Macmillan, 1963, argued from a series of historical case studies that countries on the way to industrialization must first pass through a stage of "takeoff" and later through one of "drive to mature industrialization." Armstrong omits the latter, thus arriving at the following stages: preindustrial, takeoff, industrial, and postindustrial.

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society. The relative egalitarianism of the past was facilitated by rapid expansion of the various official hierarchies, as well as by the high attrition rate due to purges and war. With the stabilization of conditions, the advantages of a favorable family background and good "connections" in optimizing educational opportunities and access to the right success escalators may be growing more crucial. There are signs that this has already become a highly sensitive issue in the Soviet Union.

A third general comment is that *The European Administrative Elite* provides a wealth of comparative case materials, generalizations, and concepts that invite more extensive application to the Soviet and other Communist systems. Space does not permit even a selective listing, but two examples are Armstrong's discussions of how the prefectural role tends to orient officials to development (pp. 261–66) and of the psychological tendencies of engineers confronted by development decisions—for instance, their inclination to ignore socioeconomic cost-benefit considerations and to engage in "human engineering" (pp. 185–88). One of the author's findings that deserves specific mention concerns the symbiotoc relationship that may develop between the role-definitions of high officials, recruitment patterns, and educational systems. Such relationships may owe their origins to quite specific and even fortuitous circumstances, but once established, they prove highly tenacious, even when clearly dysfunctional. The engineers who dominate the Politburo may prove no more capable than the Oxford- and Cambridge-trained masters of Whitehall of appreciating and responding to the dangers inherent in this tendency.

It would be valuable, but beyond the scope of this commentary, to review the now considerable literature on the Soviet politico-administrative elite in the light of Armstrong's concepts and observations. However, Morozow's *Das sowjetische Establishment* merits brief mention as an illustration of why Armstrong's new approach invites wider application. Morozow's study consists of a 100-page analysis of the makeup of the 1966 CPSU Central Committee, followed by an alphabetical collection of potted biographies similar to those available in official publications. Despite some use (and misuse) of political science terminology, the book is singularly lacking in conceptual sophistication or methodological rigor. The method is essentially one of old-fashioned sovietological area expertise. Yet, by focusing on one of the aspects also brought out in Armstrong's analysis, namely the corps-like clusterings within the Soviet elite, Morozow succeeds in making numerous discriminations and comparisons of greater *political* interest than those presented in many works of a more scholarly character. The point is not only that a lot of mileage is to be gained from Armstrong's concepts in terms of opening avenues for further work on the Soviet elite, but that these concepts may assist theoretical elucidation and refinement of many "intuitive" perceptions of the past.

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"The State of the Word"

By Sergius Yakobson

MARTIN DEWHIRST and ROBERT FARRELL, Eds.: *The Soviet Censorship.* Metuchen, N. J., The Scarecrow Press, 1973.

THIS SLENDER volume, neatly printed and bound (paradoxically, in bright red), discusses one of the bleakest aspects of Soviet life—censorship. It is an institution that not only deprives humble and elite alike in the Soviet Union of access to truth and fills the lives of freedom-loving intellectuals with danger, but also makes the life of foreign correspondents in Moscow uncomfortable and represents a major stumbling block on the road to détente between the Soviet Union and the West.

Censorship, of course, is not new in the USSR. The Bolsheviks imposed censorship two days after coming to power, falsely representing it as a "temporary and extraordinary" measure. The regime equated the threat posed to it by an uncensored press to the danger of "bombs and machine guns" [1]—an attitude that was to prove fraught with grave long-term consequences for Soviet society.

The traumatic effect of the system of official censorship in the early 1920's is perhaps best illustrated by an excerpt from an extraordinary letter written by Maxim Gorky from Germany to his friend, the Russian émigré poet Vladislav F. Khodasevich, in 1923:

Of news which stuns the mind I can inform you that . . . in Russia Nadezhda Krupskaia [Lenin's wife] and a certain M. Speransky have forbidden for reading: Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Vladimir Solovev, Taine, Ruskin, Nietzsche, Lev Tolstoy, Leskov, Jasinsky (!) and many other similar heretics. And it is decreed: "The section on religion must contain only anti-religious books." All this, supposedly, is by no means fiction, but is printed in a book entitled, A Guide on the Removal of Anti-artistic and Counterrevolutionary Literature from Libraries Serving the Mass Reader.

I affirm that I have written in "supposedly" above the line, for I still cannot make myself believe in this intellectual vampirism, and I will not believe it until I see the Guide.

The first impression I experienced was so strong that I started writing to Moscow to announce my repudiation of Russian citizenship. What else can I do if this atrocity turns out to be true?

If you only knew, dear V. F., how desperately hard and depressing it is for me! [2]

The *Guide* referred to—a small, white booklet—*did* exist, and a copy of it had, strangely enough, already been given to Gorky.[3]

The volume under review offers valuable information on the state of Soviet censorship. It is a masterfully edited and profusely annotated translation of the minutes of a symposium held in London in 1971 under the auspices of the now extinct Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR, in cooperation with Radio Liberty. Its participants included not only West European and American Sovietologists Max Hayward, Leopold Labedz, the late Victor Frank, Albert Parry, Alec Nove, and Peter B. Reddaway, but also a number of émigré Soviet writers, journalists, and scholars, including Arkady Belinkov and his wife Natalia Belinkova, Anatoly Kuznetsov, Yuri Demin, Leonid Finkelstein, and Anatol and Nadine Popluiko, all of whom had sought and found refuge in the West. Since the Western participants functioned mostly as able interviewers,

[1] Decree on the Press, signed by Lenin, *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1917 (old style).

[2] *Harvard Slavic Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.), Vol. 1, 1953, pp. 306-07.

[3] Khodasevich is quoted to this effect in *ibid.*, p. 307. The fact that Gorky had apparently forgotten indicated his distress over the whole matter.

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the publication consists primarily of authentic first-hand testimony about the oppression of Soviet intellectual life based on the personal observations, experiences, and reflections of some of the victims. Thus, Belinkov, talented writer, literary critic, and author of the first selection in the volume (which is dedicated to his memory), spent nearly 13 years in Soviet labor camps. His and the other accounts are packed with *prima facie* evidence of the dismal situation that prevails not only in the Soviet literary world but also in the realms of music, cinema, and science.

In Soviet society, censorship is imposed from above in the name of Marxist-Leninist doctrine—or what remains of it. In Stalin's time, the Leader himself assumed the role of censor—even personally altering a text on occasion. In the post-Stalin era members of the highest Kremlin command—*e.g.*, Khrushchev, Suslov, and Madame Furtseva—apparently were equally involved in censorship operations.

As a result of five decades of censorship, the great Russian literary tradition has been virtually shattered, and literary standards debased. Manuscripts submitted for publication and censorship have been stripped of their original message, transformed, and mutilated. To cite Belinkov's testimony, the Soviet system "not only censors a writer but dictates what he shall say" and in what form. To begin a novel dramatically with a train crash, for example, is regarded as offensive to Soviet audiences. Such negative events, reflecting badly on the Soviet state, are not supposed to occur and certainly should not be given prominence; hence the opening must be changed. Under such pressures, writers produce much less, and even then only a fraction of the works submitted for publication are ever printed. One recalls Andrei Voznesensky's 1965 *Lament on Two Unborn Poems:*

Amen.
I have killed a poem. Killed it unborn. To hell with it.
We bury.
Bury poems. Come see.
We bury.[4]

The capricious dictates of official censorship do more than harm the quality and restrict the quantity of literary production. Faced with the necessity of reformulating and rewriting to placate the party censors, the Soviet author finds himself exercising a self-censorship that leads to a loss of self-respect and identity, and even, in some cases, of the will to live. In the words of Natalia Belinkova,

. . . the writer cripples himself and his works by complying with the laws and requirements of the very ideology which is crushing him and his fellow writers.

Anatoly Kuznetsov, currently in self-imposed exile in England, also attests to the agonies of self-censorship experienced by himself:

. . . there are dangers involved in prostituting yourself, of bartering away your conscience in that strange world of perpetual intrigues and constant self-censorship. It is the road to destruction, because the official, external censorship, by engendering self-censorship and compromise, destroys the soul, destroys the artist, and destroys the human being. I, personally, have gone down the road of surrender to the very brink of destruction, where I felt like either committing suicide or going out of my mind. I fled from the Soviet Union like an animal saving itself from a natural calamity: anywhere, but only away, away; otherwise—destruction.

Others have not been as fortunate: Nikolai Pogodin, forced to rewrite his novel *Kremlin Chimes* for the fourth time, died before the task was completed.

In attempting to delude or evade the censor, the unorthodox Soviet writer resorts to subterfuge—allusions, hints, images, Aesopian language, implications. He writes of eternal values rather than of the depressing realities of Soviet life, and he sometimes publishes abroad under a pseudonym. Yet, when there is an occasional victory, when an author succeeds in getting his genuine thoughts into print, there is often a heavy price to pay—expulsion from the writer's union, interrogation, even trial and imprisonment.

For their part, the censors, be they editors in publishing houses or officials of the central censorship organ, tend to act less out of conviction than from fear—that ever-present element in Soviet society. Page after page is cut and passages sacrificed because "they" (the party authorities) would not want them to appear. The censor's own freedom becomes more precious to him than the freedom of the printed word. Yet, despite this caution, censors sometimes disappear suddenly for having let by what is sardonically

[4] This was printed in Voznesensky's anthology *Ten zvuka* (Shade of Sound), Moscow, Molodaia Gvardiia, 1970. The present translation, by Hedrick Smith, appeared in *The New York Times*, June 7, 1974.

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called a "political misprint." The blindness of such censorship was belated acknowledged by Khrushchev himself after his fall from power. In his taped reminiscences published in the West, Khrushchev expresses regret for having suppressed publication in the USSR of Nobel prize-winner Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago,* which he admits he had never even taken the trouble to read. At long last, the late Soviet leader was moved to state in retrospect:

When dealing with creative minds, administrative measures are always most destructive and nonprogressive. . . . In general, I think we should be more tolerant and extend wider opportunities to our creative intelligentsia.[5]

The findings of the London symposium remain as valid and pertinent today as when first expressed some four years ago, for the intellectual atmosphere in the Soviet Union has hardly improved. In fact, as the Soviet historian, Roy A. Medvedev, observed in his typescript circulated in Moscow last April:

The administrative, ideological, and political pressure from above is mounting and is directed at suppression of intellectual freedom, at ever greater unification of the thinking of the Soviet people, and at propagating obsolete ideological dogmas and norms.[6]

Solzhenitsyn's famous September 1973 letter to the Soviet leadership, incorporating his proposal that censorship be abolished for everything except purely political writings, remains unanswered,[7] and the brutal treatment of the man—climaxed by eviction from his native land and loss of citizenship—is now, of course, a *cause célèbre.*

Nevertheless, the independent-minded elements of the Soviet intelligentsia continue their struggle against oppressive officialdom with undiminished courage. In January of this year, the aged and almost blind Soviet writer, Lidia Chukovskaia, when facing expulsion from the prestigious Union of Soviet Writers for her independent writings, addressed a defiant message to the bureaucracy of the Union:

The state of the word in our country is truly a desperate one: when someone says something that doesn't coincide with your opinion of this very minute, he is labeled anti-Soviet; when someone abroad criticizes a bad thing that is taking place in our country, this is declared to be interference in our domestic affairs. This is the way you run things. But it is impossible to administer the word, the sacred treasure of one's soul; with such words one can fascinate, heal, make one happy, expose, alarm, but not govern. One can control only by hindering the word, by obstructing the word, by damming up the word, by removing a book from a publications plan or from a library, by breaking up type that has been set, by not printing, by casting an author out of the Union, by relegating a book from the 1974 publications plan to the 1976 plan, and by appropriating the printing paper for oneself, or by publishing Filev's[8] *prose in a million-copy edition. And that is the kind of administration you are running—hindering, putting on the brakes, forbidding.*

The word is the sacred treasure of the soul. It alone transforms the world. Even you are not strong enough to stop it. . . .

What will those you expel do? They will write books. Even prisoners wrote and are writing books. What will you do? You will write resolutions.

Go ahead and write them![9]

[5] *Time* (New York), May 6, 1974, pp. 43-44.

[6] *The New York Times,* April 29, 1974.

[7] A. Solzhenitsyn, *Pismo vozhdiam Sovetskovo Soiuza* (Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union), Paris, YMCA Press, 1974, pp. 48-49.

[8] A. A. Filev, a third-rate Soviet establishment writer.

[9] The full Russian text of Chukovskaia's statement appeared in *Novyi Zhurnal* (New York), No. 114, March 1974, pp. 229-31.

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The Challenge of the USSR

By Immo Stabreit

ADAM B. ULAM: Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973. New York, Praeger, 1973.
KURT LONDON, Ed.: *The Soviet Impact On World Politics.* New York, Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974.
EDWARD HALLETT CARR: The *Soviet Impact on the Western World.* Berkeley, Cal., Howard Fertig Inc., Publisher, 1973, and New York, Macmillan Co., 1974.

IN THE CLOSING chapter of his compendium on Moscow's foreign policy, Kurt London arrives at the somewhat melancholy conclusion that there is still too little understanding of the Soviet Union's political system in the non-Communist world, and that the less familiar the leaders of other states are with the background and psychology of Soviet policy, the more vulnerable they are to its intrinsic dangers. One would want to agree with him and to add that the nature, methods, and aims of Soviet foreign policy—once a predominantly European-American concern—have now become of critical interest to political elites all over the globe as a result of the vast expansion of Soviet power and influence since World War II.

Adam Ulam's excellent book, *"Expansion and Coexistence,"* attempts to analyze all three of these aspects of Soviet foreign policy and thus goes far beyond a mere description of historical developments. One does not have to agree with all the details of this comprehensive and learned book and its sometimes far-reaching yet always well-documented theses in order to enjoy reading it immensely. Ulam has a rare gift for laying bare the dramatic options that the makers of Soviet foreign policy have faced at so many critical junctures in the nation's history—a quality that injects an element of suspense quite rare in books of this type.

This revised second edition of a study which the author first published in 1968, brings the author's analysis of Soviet foreign policy up to 1973 and thus encompasses such momentous developments as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, the initial phases of East-West detente, and the October 1973 war in the Middle East. It appears—quite opportunely—at a time when the policy of détente seems to be coming under increasing question in the West, and when it may have become the subject of some soul-searching in the East as well.

Western evaluation of Soviet foreign policy, one might venture to say, has tended to oscillate between extremes. One of these extremes has been uncompromising rejection of any policy emanating from what was considered an ideologically-motivated power as voracious in subverting other societies as cancerous cells are in destroying healthy tissue. For a long time, this position—which found eloquent expression in the catchword *"cordon sanitaire"*—flatly ruled out having anything to do with the Soviet Union, much less attempting to draw that country into the international community through a process of "domestication." At the other extreme, Western opinion has periodically swung over to a view of Soviet policies as simply those of another big power satisfied with its world position, willing—if not eager—to fit into the concert of nations, and more concerned with its own security than with further expansion of its influence.

In his opening chapter, which deals with the "sources" of Soviet foreign policy, Ulam helps us to understand why the ideology of world revolution that initially animated that policy was so unpalatable to the politicians and diplomats of the old world that they instinctively leaned toward the first of these two extreme positions. Since then, obviously, the emphasis on revolutionary ideology has become increasingly muted. In tracing this development, Ulam does an admirable job not only in clarifying the mo-

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tives of Soviet leaders and the sometimes compelling material and spiritual frame of reference within which they have operated, but also in demonstrating the rational basis of Soviet policy. Since lack of understanding leads often enough to fear, his study makes a significant contribution to a more balanced and sober evaluation of Soviet foreign policies. At the same time, Ulam has no illusions about the nature of those policies. If there is one central message that emerges from his book, it is that the Western nations will have to brace themselves for many more years of a continued measuring of strength with the Communist world. Writing of the Khrushchev era, Ulam points out that the waning effectiveness of Communist ideology as a force of social cohesion at home posed a difficult dilemma for the Soviet leadership, with far-reaching implications for its external policy:

If the ideology is to become decorative and meaningless in terms of concrete problems of Soviet life, where in the last resort will be the rationale for the totalitarian system, for the assumed omnipotence and omniscience of the highest councils of the Communist party? The focus for "proving" Marxism-Leninism—and by the same token of preserving something of the old ideological élan and sense of mission, without which the most efficient totalitarian regime runs the danger of internal disintegration—thus lay increasingly outside the USSR, in the successes of communism and defeats for the West in foreign lands. (p. 606)

These lines appear to be just as applicable today.

Remarkable as Ulam's study is, some of the author's evaluations seem debatable. An example is his explanation of the uncompromising position taken on the German issue by the Soviet Union at the 1954 conference of "Big Four" foreign ministers in Berlin —a development which Ulam ascribes to diminished Soviet fear of a renascent West German military force after the Soviet Union had exploded its own hydrogen bomb (p. 551). Was that really the reason, or was it not rather the weak internal position of the Soviet leadership in the aftermath of Stalin's death that made it take a much more unbending stand than it had in the famous Soviet note of March 1952?[1] Again, would Stalin have been able to sacrifice East Germany without its having the slightest effect on his position in the East bloc as Ulam argues on p. 538 (personally, the reviewer would like to agree with this), or would Soviet acceptance of a united Germany have set off a chain reaction throughout the East European satellite empire, as the author somewhat contradictorily suggests elsewhere (p. 507)?

There are also some lacunae in Ulam's account. For instance, one would have liked to read something about Khrushchev's plans with regard to Germany early in 1964. The trip of Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, to the Federal Republic and the attempted assassination of a member of the German Embassy in Moscow that summer suggested that something was in the wind, and if the "memoirs" of former Polish party chief Wladislaw Gomulka are to be relied upon, the German issue played a part in Khrushchev's downfall.[2]

In spite of these small flaws, the book as a whole is highly perceptive. Ulam's account of the influence of the threatening rift with China on Soviet decision-making is especially fascinating; and although his conclusions are bold, facts would seem to bear them out. He argues that, by the late 1950's and early 1960's, the only danger that West Germany presented to the Soviet Union lay in its potential access to nuclear weapons furnished by the United States and that preventing this was the major thrust of Soviet policy. Awareness that once the Sino-Soviet rift became common knowledge in the West the Soviet bargaining position might be impaired, Ulam maintains, goaded Khrushchev into daring action—the Berlin ultimatum of 1958.

Among the painful but undoubtedly correct conclusions Ulam draws is that the Vietnam war in more ways than one played into the hands of Moscow. The idea that the Kremlin might be interested in extending a helping hand to extract the US from the Vietnam quagmire—a notion quite incomprehensibly entertained for a time in influential Western diplomatic circles— was, to put it mildly, baseless. If anything helped decisively to propel the Soviet Union into a position of strategic parity with the US, Ulam contends, it was the Vietnam war with

[1] The unexpected Soviet note of March 10, 1952—suggesting a reunified, rearmed, and neutral Germany—is discussed by Ulam on p. 536.

[2] Between April and July 1973 the Tel Aviv Polish-language newspaper *Nowiny Kurier* published in 14 installments what purported to be the "reminiscences" of the one-time First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. The implication that Soviet party figures were unhappy with Khrushchev's entertainment of the idea of rapprochement with the Federal Republic of Germany appears in the May 11 installment.

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its debilitating effects not only on the social fabric and economy of the United States, and indirectly on the economies of the US's allies, but also on America's diplomatic position in other theaters (pp. 717–18).

In discussing the outlook for the policy of East-West détente, Ulam takes a cautious attitude. However large the area of cooperation may have become—and some of it would appear to be mere window dressing—he believes that the recent period has "presented abundant evidence of the unchanging nature of Soviet ambitions" (p. 728), and that the internal structure of the Soviet political system continues to push the country in pursuit of foreign policy successes. For the West, in his view, this definitely does not mean that areas of common interest should not be explored and, wherever found, enlarged: détente should be pursued wherever possible and plausible. But it also means that the time to lower the West's guard has not yet come.

THIS IS ALSO the message that seems to emerge from the compilation edited by Kurt London on "The Soviet Impact on World Politics." The book brings together the views of an impressive array of authors with long-standing reputations as experts in their respective fields (including London himself), who address themselves to a multifaceted analysis of Soviet foreign policy and strategic concepts in the postwar era.

In the initial section, Leonard Shapiro and Adam Ulam set forth a conceptual framework for understanding Soviet foreign policy and the way it changed "the rules of the game" in the international arena after 1917. Shapiro underlines the still essentially totalitarian nature of the Soviet political system, which—in his view—makes it necessary for the leadership always to behave as if the USSR were at war with the outside world. He does not believe in a satisfied communism:

The avowed purpose of Soviet Russia has been less crudely formulated and has changed in the course of the past fifty-six years with respect to both timetable and emphasis. But it has not changed in its essential feature, which is and always has been a world in in which what is usually described as "socialism," and which in practice means state capitalism administered by a Communist party oligarchy, prevails. (p. 6)

Ulam's analysis of the effects of Soviet foreign policy on the traditional system of interstate relations arrives at conclusions that are hardly more cheerful. The combination of Soviet power and a dynamic worldwide political movement, he believes, has destroyed the traditional rules of the international game. And although communism has not been able to construct an alternative world order, it persists in challenging and encroaching on what remains of the old.

Space limitations do not permit comment on each of the regional and topical essays in the London volume, which embrace all major geographic areas with the conspicuous exception of sub-Saharan Africa, and all of which testify to the perspicacity and erudition of their authors. One general conclusion that emerges from the book as a whole is that in virtually all regions of the world the influence of the Soviet Union has grown vastly and will most likely continue to grow. Moreover, as Thomas Wolfe points out in his essay on Soviet military strategy and policy, the whole pattern of international politics today is in a state of flux. The postwar period of attempted containment of the Soviet Union has come to an end. With the Soviet Union striving to expand its influence in such strategically important regions as the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East, the US redefining its world posture in conformity with its real potential, and the People's Republic of China and Japan playing larger roles in international affairs, the world has become increasingly multipolar. In this complex new environment, the USSR and the US find themselves increasingly faced with situations in which they have to deal with overlapping as well as conflicting interests. For Moscow, this task appears to be becoming all the more difficult as the Soviet Union undergoes an experience not entirely new to the West: it is discovering that the farther its influence reaches out into the world, the less amenable its clients and friends prove to be to Soviet advice in crises affecting their interests.

While acting in accordance with a clear notion of its security requirements in Europe and groping for a consistent long-term strategy in Asia, the USSR has often moved in a very pragmatic way in pursuit of its primary aim of undermining Western influence (this perhaps comes out most clearly in the London volume's essays on the Middle East and Latin America). Nowhere (except in Western Europe after World War II) have Soviet moves been countered consistently, and one may well ask whether there is now any way of doing so, even for a power as

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strong as the United States. The USSR, however, may already be on the verge of finding itself overextended in its international commitments—a fact which doubtless explains Moscow's decreased interest in having Communist regimes installed in many of the regions where it is involved politically and strategically. For such regimes would undoubtedly count on Soviet support, whereas, the Kremlin would presumably rather have the West continue to foot at least some of the bills in areas where Moscow's influence has already been firmly established, unrealistic though this hope may be. Moreover, the expansion of the USSR's worldwide influence confronts Moscow with a further dilemma: while it continues to try to sever the roots of Western economic power wherever and however possible, it has to reconcile this policy with the realization that the USSR itself now has a stake in this same Western economic potential.

Regrettably, not even a book of this scope can deal with all aspects of East-West rivalry. Thus, Alfred Grosser, in his otherwise informative essay on Western Europe, does not deal with the European security conference, which is after all, one of the main instruments of Soviet foreign policy in today's Europe. If, as he seems to imply, the threat to Western Europe is largely internal and arises from the many social and economic problems plaguing the non-Communist world, this would lend added importance to West European unification. Yet such unification, he correctly points out, would hardly change the security problems facing Western Europe. In any event, one would have liked Mr. Grosser to give greater attention to Soviet attitudes not only toward the European security conference but also toward attempts at European integration.

The Ulam and London books, in part covering the same ground, share common views on Soviet foreign policy. They make valuable reading for anyone interested in international relations, and no one dealing with the Soviet Union in a professional capacity should fail to acquaint himself with both of them.

THE LAST OF the three volumes reviewed here is of a different order, examining interactions between the Soviet Union and the West on a much broader plane. This collection of lectures delivered by Edward Hallett Carr in 1946 analyzes the social, economic, and philosophical impact of Marxism-Leninism on the fabric of Western society and thought. While the premises set forth in the first selections, in particular those concerning the realities of the Soviet state and society, are debatable and lead to even more debatable comparisons, one may well agree with Carr's fundamental diagnosis, which is that the period of individualism ushered in by the Renaissance and the Reformation most probably came to an end with World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution.

Carr perceives a "peaceful penetration of the Western world by ideas emanating from the Soviet Union," a fact hardly open to discussion if one considers the almost universal acceptance today of the conviction that society determines man and his views. What Carr could not foresee in 1946 was the seemingly strong counter appeal which Western ideas of individualism would have to Soviet minds in the early 1970's, causing the rulers in the Kremlin to move into action their huge police apparatus in response.

Carr is not unbiased. He is seemingly convinced of the superiority and desirability of socialism, although certainly not the kind of socialism that was being practiced in the Soviet Union in 1946. He even seems to look upon certain negative aspects of the Soviet totalitarian state and society as simply a "matter of degree" rather than of principle.

This is a view that one cannot easily accept. With all our doubts and troubles in the West, we continue to be convinced that the rights of the human individual do not exist solely in the social sphere. Moreover, had not Western social democracy by 1918 progressed far along the road toward a fuller realization of that third catchword of the French Revolution, *fraternité*? It is difficult to see what positive contribution Marxism-Leninism as applied in Russia has made in these respects, Soviet propaganda claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, Soviet practice so thoroughly discredited the term "socialism" that only in recent years has the term undergone a renaissance, even among Western Communists—and then hardly with deference to the Soviet example.

Carr is best in his final two essays dealing with the ideological impact of the Soviet Union on Western thought and his view of future interaction between East and West. One can wholeheartedly agree with his conclusion that the fate of the Western world will turn on its abiilty to meet the Soviet challenge by devising new forms of social and economic action that will successfully apply what is valid in Western individualist and democratic traditions to the problems of modern mass society.

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In Search of Marxism's Relevance

By Jyotirmoy Banerjee

DAVID McCLELLAN: *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought.* New York, Harper and Row, 1973.
ROBERT C. TUCKER: *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx,* 2nd ed. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1972.
BERTELL OLLMAN: *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society.* Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
DANIEL TARSCHYS: *Beyond the State: The Future Polity in Classical and Soviet Marxism.* Stockholm, Swedish Studies in International Relations, 1971.

NO THINKER over the last hundred years has remained so much at the nodal point of heated debates, varied interpretations, political movements, and entire governmental systems as the scholar from Trier, the descendant of a long line of rabbis from Bohemia and Holland. The titles of the volumes under review reflect, though by no means exhaustively, the fluid and comprehensive nature of the thought of Karl Marx. One can only wonder at the encyclopedic breadth of Marx's scholarship when one considers the elaborate project he drew up during 1858-62 for the *Critique of Political Economy,* to which *Capital* was to be only the introduction.

To essay a study of the life and thought of such a figure is clearly a major undertaking. David McClellan's monumental work on Marx does justice to the task, and he performs this feat on an even more ambitious scale than such worthy predecessors as Franz Mehring and Isaiah Berlin. This attractive volume traces the painstaking evolution of Marx's thought against the background of the contemporary milieu of ideas. McClellan's approach calls to mind the poet Goethe's famous lines:

The spirit of the ages, be it known,
Is, in the main, the spirit we all own,
Wherein the ages are reflected.[1]

Not only does the spirit of the times affect the thought which emerges in a given milieu, but it also influences the interpretation or emphasis which scholars of subsequent generations and different milieux choose to place on the views of a given thinker. Interpretation of Marxism as a "science" has, of course, long been considered outdated in the West —both because of the sterility of the Marxist dogmatism of Communist parties the world over and because capitalism, in defiance of Marx's predictions, has shown the capacity to survive and even to flourish. Nevertheless, orthodox Marxism[2] commands the formal allegiance of a third of mankind today, including the giant states of the USSR and China. Hence, non-Communist scholars are still forced to reckon with Marxism. In their search for meaningful new insights into Marx's thought, they bypass Marxian scientism in order to concentrate on other aspects: the early writings, which furnished the raw materials for Marx's subsequent works on capital, and his prognostications about man's eventual transition from the historical realm of necessity to that of freedom.

Marx's treatment of the alienation of man, a central theme in his early works, is the subject of two of the books examined here—those by Robert Tucker and Bertell Ollman. The Tucker volume advances the thesis that Marx's theory about the dualistic contradiction in man's existence—reflected in the split self of *homo sapiens*—is a logical outgrowth of German philosophical tradition. Marx, it is maintained, projected upon society a drama of conflict originating in the "inner life" of man. Tucker draws an analogy be-

[1] Lines 577-79 from Goethe's *Faust,* tr. J. F. L. Raschen, Ithaca, New York, Thrift Press, 1949.

[2] The term "orthodox Marxism" refers here to the apotheosis of any brand of Marxism as *the* state ideology, the only Truth.

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tween this concern with man's "inner life" and the traditional concerns of religion. In doing so, he endeavors to show the impact of Judeo-Christian eschatology upon Marx's thinking and winds up characterizing Marx as essentially a teacher of homocentric religion. While interesting, this thesis is based on superficial grounds; moreover, it turns Marx upside down. For Marx, man's inner life is very much conditioned by his external, socioeconomic life, not by some Faustian inner conflict. Logically, therefore, a split inner life would reflect man's split external self, his alienated social being, not *vice versa.*

Marx was not the first to theorize on alienation from an atheistic standpoint. Already, in the first half of the 19th century, such figures as Georg W. Hegel, D. F. Strauss, Moses Hess, Bruno Bauer, and Ludwig Feuerbach had written on the problem, all of them basically agreeing that religion was a false consciousness in man reflecting his alienation from his true self. For Strauss and Hess, the true message of Christianity was contained in the symbolic value of Jesus as the ideal man, the *homo noumenon.*

When Marx came to deal with alienation, however, he immediately criticized all hitherto existing *Religionskritik* from a viewpoint that was distinctively his own. While others had identified the phenomenon of alienation, they had failed to delve deeply into its *causes.* For Marx, on the other hand, criticism of religion *per se* was insufficient; the attack had to be concentrated on the external world—*i.e.,* on the societal structure of which religion was the "spiritual aroma." This basic Marxian view that down-to-earth socioeconomic circumstances mold class consciousness can be ignored only at the risk of falsifying his thought.

In addition to clouding this issue, Tucker presents an inconsistent portrayal of the concept of "self" in German philosophy. He seems to confuse the philosophical category of the self, as conceived by Hegel and Marx, with the psychoanalytical notion of the ego of Sigmund Freud and R. L. Stevenson.

Ollman also sets himself the task of expounding and elucidating Marx's alienation theory, but he does so in a different and more systematic fashion. For one thing, his rigorous linguistic methodology and attention to semantic context underlines the necessity of dealing with Marx's notions within such a framework.

The phenomenon of alienation is of course age-old and has been interpreted in diverse ways. Defined in terms of false consciousness, it can be traced back à la Tucker to the Judeo-Christian tradition and its concept of the fallen man whose troubled history reflected a quest for ultimate salvation from his state of alienation. In Hinduism, Shankaracharya propounded the doctrine that it was Maya (illusion) which prevented the development of true insight into the unity of the Atman (self) with the cosmos, thereby creating a false consciousness of duality in man.

It was John Locke who, in more recent times, blazed a new trail for theorists of alienation by asserting that man implanted part of his self in any object which he created by means of his own labor and therefore had the natural right to appropriate it. This was, in incipient form, the labor theory of value, which ultimately formed the nucleus of Marx's alienation theory. Rousseau traced man's alienation to the degenerating impact of civilization, while Hegel followed up the anthropological implication of Locke's theory by stressing the significance of labor as the distinguishing function or essence (*Wesen*) of man. It was labor, he held, that forced nature out of her indifference and humanized her by subjecting her to various plans and ideas. Feuerbach elaborated a parallel theme in maintaining that concepts like "I" and "you" reflected societal relations based on labor and as such had revolutionary implications.

Assimilating these ideas and many others besides, Marx turned his critical attention to the capitalist social system, which he saw as the root cause of a fetishism of commodities. Unlike Rousseau, he concentrated his critique on a particular system of civilization rather than on civilization *per se,* making a brilliant attempt to expose the living societal relations concealed within the reified concepts of contemporary political economy. In his view, commodities, which he held to be actually part of the proletarian self as products of labor power, developed their own laws of momentum under capitalism, thereby becoming divorced from, and in effect, coming to dominate their actual producers. He visualized the post-capitalist societies of the future as systems in which this alienation of the proletariat would disappear.

The pertinent question that arises in this connection is what relevance the Marxian notion of alienation retains today. The Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács, in his famous work on alienation, *History and Class Consciousness,* stressed the develop-

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ment of *true* class consciousness on the part of the proletariat as the *sine qua non* of its deliverance from the fetters of capitalism.[3] Admittedly, such development might not be spontaneous and automatic, even in conditions where the contradictions between the productive forces and capitalist relations of production have matured. With an eye on the behavioral pattern of social democracy, Lukács cautioned that proletarian class consciousness—the terminal class consciousness in the teleological movement of history—had to be developed not only in opposition to capitalism but also to any form of false consciousness within the proletariat itself (*e.g.*, petty trade-unionism). In other words, an abstract proletarian General Will had to be strictly imposed on the individual proletarian in order to free him from alienation. Lukács' cautionary note on proletarian consciousness suggests the slippery character of the materials of the social sciences[4] and the inability of Marxism, or any other theory for that matter, to produce cut-and-dried explanations and laws. The working classes in the classical capitalist countries today continue to show little enthusiasm for shaking off the Maya of relative affluence.

It fell to Herbert Marcuse to discover an alienated universe in contemporary technetronic societies (including Communist ones). According to his "transcendental" social critique, the mechanical giants of today are using human beings engaged in production by manipulating their needs and demands so as to create and maintain mass consumption and thereby effect the perpetuation of vested interests. The consequence, he argues, is that in spite of relative affluence and material prosperity, man in highly industrialized societies remains alienated, and so powerful is the universal worship of the prevalent socioeconomic system that all forms of oppositional institutions which supposedly safeguard democracy and freedom in the West get coopted into that system.

However, the Marcusean goal —a universe where "repressive" and "false" needs are abnegated and all individuals thus become liberated—is likely to remain a utopia, an abstract philosophical thought-category with little practical value, so long as the gaping chasm in material prosperity between the underdeveloped Third World and the superadvanced regions shows no sign of disappearing.[5] Marcuse's conception of the alienated, one-dimensional man springs from a reaction against mature industrialism reminiscent of Marx's reaction against incipient capitalism. However, Marcuse no longer pins his hope on the proletariat—which, according to him, has identified itself with the establishment in the developed societies—but rather looks to those "outside the productive process."[6]

FROM PLATO to Marcuse, dissatisfaction with the prevalent forms of society has been perennial, reflecting perhaps what Milovan Djilas has called the "unperfectness" of society—a term which also carries the implication of permanent imperfectibility.[7] Yet men of ideas continue to ponder ways to attain a better social order, and one issue that has long been at the center of debate concerns the proper role and function of the state. It is this ever-topical theme in the history of ideas, particularly Marxian ideas, that serves as the subject of Daniel Tarschys' able and comprehensive study.

Two contradictory currents had come to govern the modern world ever since the 18th century, one flowing from the Industrial Revolution and bringing about an unprecedented economic interdependence of all the world's regions, the other set off by the French Revolution and resulting in the rise of nationalism and a strengthened system of national statehood with rigid political borders, tariff barriers, etc. It was the dream of a number of thinkers of the 19th century, Marx included, that the state would ultimately outlive its *raison d'être* and wither away, and that the world, already split into numerous states, would then be freed from unnecessary state political controls under the pressure of growing productive forces. A genuine

[3] Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studie in Marxist Dialectics* (tr.), London, Merlin Press, 1971. Lukács himself subsequently criticized his stress on the consciousness factor as excessive.

[4] For an epistemological discussion of this issue, see Hedley Bull's classic essay, "International Theory. The Case for a Classical Approach," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1969.

[5] The disruptive potential of this growing gap was explicitly noted by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1973. "Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, Part 1, p. 84.

[6] Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man. The Ideology of Industrial Society*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964.

[7] Milovan Djilas, *The Unperfect Society. Beyond the New Class* (tr.), New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969.

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world community would thus emerge in a purely functionalist form, dedicated to regionally specialized production and peaceful trade. This vision of a minimized role for the state against a background of rapidly expanding productive activities was shared by both socialist and *laissez-faire* thinkers.

It was Keynes in this century who dealt a death blow to the concept of a withering away of the state. Instead, he saw it as a necessary instrumentality for regulating the economy and performing social welfare functions. The growing role that the state has in fact come to play in economic, social, cultural, and political affairs today is reflected in the proliferation of ministries and departments, committees, and subcommittees in all the major states of the world—in institutions such as "delegated legislation" in Britain and economic planning in both the Communist world and countries like India. The vision of the disappearance of the political and economic barriers artificially dividing nations under the inexorable impact of universal economic logic and necessity largely remains just that—a mere vision. The state continues to be the most powerful form of human organization. The newly-born nations jealously guard their nationhood and articulate it in and through the state. Add to this the generally accepted view that the state today is a welfare agency, and the permanency of the state, at least for the conceivable future, becomes clear.

As Tarschys rightly points out, even Soviet scholars generally tend to rationalize the fact of the consolidation of the Soviet state despite Khrushchev's declaration in 1957 that it had started to wither away. But even granting the claim of ideologists that the Soviet state has to maintain its power in the face of a hostile imperialist bloc, one fails to understand why there has been no significant *political* integration among those states within the Soviet bloc which are on a parallel level of development. What, for instance, prevents the GDR and Czechoslovakia or Romania and Bulgaria from dissolving their separate state identities and effecting interfusion? The reason clearly lies in the proliferation of *national* communisms or of polycentrism under the still powerful influence of nationalism, which three decades of socialist training have not been able to overcome. If even intersocialist proletarian fraternity has not yet progressed that far, one can hardly be sanguine about the chances for the evolution of a world functionalist community unimpeded by all those irrational forces that still divide mankind into separate political communities.

Instead of serving as the inspiration for new departures in the "socialist commonwealth," Marx's historical materialism has, as noted earlier, been fossilized into official dogma in the Communist countries. Having lost the battle for relevance in the context of super-industrialization, it has retained its appeal—in numerous shades and nuances—in the Third World, where it has, ironically, assumed the role of an ideology of industrial development for backward regions. Nevertheless, Marx's intellectual prowess remains as universally stimulating as ever. The trend toward substituting Marx the prophet—a brilliant but fallible human being—for Marx the scholar and scientist is welcome, even if it is largely confined to the non-Communist world. Whether this trend will produce an effective antithesis to orthodox Marxism and, in countering it, will produce a superior Marxist synthesis remains to be seen.

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Notes & Views
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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

VIEWS APART

TO THE EDITORS: I deeply regret the necessity of replying to Prof. Kurt London's review of my book (*Soviet and British Politics*) in your July-August 1974 issue. I would not do so if he merely disagreed with my analysis or conclusions, or pointed out some admitted difficulties of interpretation. However, his comments represent such a fundamental misreading and distortion of my thesis that I feel compelled to set the record straight for the readers of your journal.

Most importantly, Prof. London asserts that I "find it conceivable that the USSR and Great Britain could eventually converge into a single type of post-industrial welfare state," and that I try "to make a case for the existence of 'underlying similarities' that could one day lead to convergence." While such an eventuality is indeed "conceivable," I do not make such a "case" anywhere in the book, and on the contrary state my doubts about convergence more than once. Although I emphasized certain structural aspects in which Soviet and British government are remarkably similar, I also made it clear in the opening pages (p. xiv) that "there is certainly no reason to believe that the two systems are converging completely" and on the same page listed three "convergence-limiting factors." At the end of the book I also concluded that convergence into an "essentially identical" form of political system is "highly improbable."

Prof. London also charges that I am "not in touch with the realities of the Soviet scene" because I mention the Soviet "quest for more chemical fertilizers, plastics and Fiat automobiles, a comfortable style of life" as characteristic of contemporary Soviet society. He retorts that "the regime's ongoing repression of individual freedoms, censorship of the press, and suppression of any deviations from the one-party line hardly constitute or contribute to 'a comfortable style of life'."

The logic of this line of argumentation is certainly obscure. Anyone who has been to the Soviet Union in the last decade can attest to the desire of Soviet citizens to acquire the possessions associated with material comfort and the regime's emphasis on production of such consumer goods. Repression of individual freedoms and censorship (mentioned several times in the book) are also part of the Soviet scene, but such repression is hardly incompatible with material comfort—especially for those who have no desire to deviate. In fact, anyone truly in touch with Soviet reality would have to acknowledge the coexistence of both phenomena in Soviet society. I only wished to suggest that the Soviet achievement in raising the standard of living may have contributed to a lessening of revolutionary zeal in the USSR, a point which London peremptorily rejects.

Almost as incredible is Prof. London's charge that I "manifest an astounding inability—or unwillingness—to distinguish between Soviet pretenses and Soviet realities." To support this accusation, he avers that I believe "both the British and Soviet peoples are ruled through 'representative organs of government' " and that the party in power (including the CPSU!) is the "choice of the people and is responsive to the people's best interest." London finds these assertions "disturbing"—and so do I. Only a very naive and foolish observer could hold such opinions, and only a very prejudiced and disgracefully sloppy reviewer could ever believe that I support such views in my book. I made it very clear that these are the assertions made by both British and Soviet governments to legitimize their regimes. My point was *not* that these Soviet claims of representative government and popularly chosen party leadership are accurate; quite the contrary, my point was that these *false* Soviet claims are also somewhat dubious when they are used by defenders of the British system. I am amazed that London could believe I support these Soviet claims after he read (I assume) my rather extensive and critical dissection of the Soviet theory and practice of representation.

Your reviewer's passionate objections to the idea of convergence apparently blinded him to the fact (which other reviewers have pointed out) that the main substance of the book does not directly concern convergence, but is rather a comparative analysis of legitimizing doctrines, institutions, and policymaking processes. His stated opinion that the differences between the British and Soviet systems are so "profound" that "exaggeration in this respect is hardly possible" made him prejudiced from the very beginning against my suggestion that there are indeed underlying similarities. Instead of concerning himself with the actual contents of the book, he launched an attack on some views which I never endorsed. The result is an appalling misrepresentation, rather than a serious attempt to deal with the genuinely controversial issues that I raised.

JEROME M. GILISON
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MR. LONDON REPLIES: I like disputation but detest name-calling. I regret having caused Professor Gillison an outbreak of temper, but if it is any consolation for him,

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reading his book was a painful task. Now he accuses me of having "misread" it. I could not review what he meant, only what he wrote. This I did. I can read print but not minds.

I have neither space nor inclination to respond in detail to his intemperate statement. I wish only to make one substantive remark. Gillison refers to my "obscure logic" in believing that oppression and material comfort (comfort??) do not constitute a bearable style of life. I would agree that the average Soviet citizen's existence is somewhat better than during the Stalin era—which is not saying much. But the overwhelming bulk of Soviet capital is still channeled into its military-industrial complex, with consumer goods production receiving the rather short end of the stick. More importantly, the dark shadow of the KGB clouds this "comfort" for virtually all Soviet citizens. To me, at least, material advantages and repression are not compatible. If Gilison thinks otherwise, it is his privilege, as it is mine to express my disagreement in what I consider rather temperate language.

The inclusion of Gilison's book in an essay on convergence seemed logical even though the book is limited to a comparison between the Soviet and British systems. One might say that the book is an example of—probably unintended—advocacy of convergence. Nowhere did I find a clear-cut statement about the chasm between East and West. As I see it, the bridge of détente is swaying in high winds across the chasm, and one can only hope the winds will die down.

KURT L. LONDON
McLean, Va.

ON TERMS AND LABELS

TO THE EDITORS: The July-August issue of *Problems of Communism* contains some very interesting material on the Middle East. I find the article by Alvin Z. Rubinstein ("Moscow and Cairo: Currents of Influence") very good but cannot resist picking a nit or two. Prof. Rubinstein's references on pages 19 and 23 to Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, describe it in terms that do not indicate its highly controversial nature. He says that it "fell somewhat short of calling for total and immediate withdrawal," but Arabs generally do regard Resolution 242 as calling for complete withdrawal, if not immediate. The problem in interpretation arises, of course, from the language of 242, which is ambiguous in the English version as to whether withdrawal should be total or less than total. The French and Arabic versions support the Arab interpretation. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has very carefully avoided saying what final lines the US favors. Prof. Rubinstein simply does not go into this complex problem but seems to accept the Israeli interpretation.

I am also puzzled by Rubinstein's reference on page 23 to Cairo's stand as "intransigent," a pejorative term that is certainly a matter of viewpoint and would be rejected by many Arabs. They see Israel as "intransigent," and regard Cairo as flexible because of its post-1967 declarations on the existence of Israel, etc.

The final nit I want to pick is his phrase "Yom Kippur War" on page 25—which is an Israeli label. The Arabs generally have called the clash the October War, although a few of them call it the "Ramadan War."

Let me emphasize that these are small points. The article was otherwise well done.

WILLIAM A. RUGH
Bethesda, Md.

MR. RUBINSTEIN REPLIES: Mr. Rugh seems intent, albeit graciously, on fastening a partisan label to the few points in my article with which he disagrees.

First, describing the background of Resolution 242 would have taken me too far afield from the focus of my essay. On November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted a compromise resolution proffered by British Ambassador Lord Caradon. It affirmed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." That it did not call (as the USSR and the Arab states wanted) for withdrawal from *all* the territories or even from *the* territories was deliberate. The ambiguity of the wording was the price the Soviets and Egyptians had to pay in order to obtain any resolution at all. The evidence of diplomats involved in the negotiations indicates that the resolution would have been rejected by the United States had the Soviets insisted on inclusion of the word "all" or "the."

After its adoption, the Arab states, the USSR, and their adherents maintained that it meant "all territories" because, they claimed, the French and Russian versions assumed the word "the" preceded "territories." However, the approved draft was written in English. Neither the French, Russian, nor Arabic versions are equally authoritative. Cairo was well aware of Lord Caradon's refusal to include the word "the," lest the intended balance and integrality of the resolution be disrupted and thereby disapproved. (See *Al-Ahram* [Cairo], Nov. 19 and 21, 1967.) Nasser accepted it because he needed some symbol of accomplishment. Once accepted, the resolution could be interpreted in the light of Egypt's aims; and the lobbying for international acceptance of this interpretation could be started—as indeed has been the case. The problem has become complicated recently because of the power relationship of the key participants and not because the provisions of the resolution failed to be clearly understood at the time.

Second, I refer to Nasser's policy in the spring of 1969 as "intransigent" because I believe this accurately describes the unimaginative, rigid policy he was then pursuing, in marked contrast to that of Sadat two years later.

Finally, the term "Yom Kippur War" was a change made at the suggestion of the editors, my manuscript having originally referred to the October 1973 Middle East War. However, this phrase is commonly and widely used in the Western press without in any way connoting a pro-Israeli policy. For example, see the lead editorial, "A Year after the Yom Kippur War," in *The Times* (London), Oct. 7, 1974. An Arab analyst has also used the term: see S. Jiryis, "The Yom Kippur War: The Beginning of the Zionist Eclipse, *Shuun Filastiniya,* November 1973, p. 13-21, cited in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), Spring 1974, p. 208.

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In the photo on page 3 of the September-October 1974 issue, the third person (on the right) with Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing and UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim is Chiao Kuan-hua, then Deputy Foreign Minister (now Foreign Minister) of the Chinese People's Republic, not Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the UN, as erroneously stated in the caption.

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